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LAND USE AND HOUSING POLICIES TO REDUCE
CONCENTRATED POVERTY
AND RACIAL SEGREGATION
Myron Orfield*

INTRODUCTION
As metropolitan areas spread over huge stretches of land, residents
living at the core, particularly poor Blacks and Latinos, become
increasingly isolated from the jobs and other life opportunities that are
rapidly dispersing among increasingly far-flung suburbs.
The
concentration of existing affordable housing in central cities 1 and older
suburbs perpetuates the isolation of low-income residents and people of
color from life opportunities available to suburban residents. 2 One result is
to reinforce the racial segregration which is intimately related to the
concentration of poverty at the urban core and in older, inner-ring suburbs. 3
Urban sprawl tends to exacerbate residential racial segregation 4 because
unchecked development at the fringe permits rapid abandonment of innersuburban and central-city housing stocks as White residents move into
expanding suburban developments. The resulting isolation of non-Whites
* Associate Professor of Law and Fesler-Lampert Chair in Urban and Regional Affairs,
University of Minnesota. Professor Orfield is Executive Director of the Institute on Race
and Poverty at the University of Minnesota, and a non-resident senior fellow at the
Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. The author thanks Daria Roithmayr, Ann
Burkhart, Brad Karkkainen, Guy Charles, C. Ann Olson for her editorial help and
substantive comments, and Scott Crain for his research assistance.
1. MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS: THE NEW SUBURBAN REALITY 46
(2002) [hereinafter ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS].
2. Id. at 122-23; John A. Powell, Opportunity-Based Housing, 12 J. AFFORDABLE
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 188, 193-94 (2003) [hereinafter Powell, OpportunityBased Housing].
3. ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supra note 1, at 49-53; John A. Powell,
Achieving Racial Justice: What’s Sprawl Got to Do With It?, POVERTY & RACE RES. ACTION
COUNCIL NEWSL. (Poverty & Race Research Action Council, Wash., D.C.), Sept./Oct. 1999,
at 1.
4. See, e.g., ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supra note 1, at 131 (“[M]any
regions become even more fragmented with growth and expansion into new communities.”).
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in the increasingly segregated areas that Whites abandon effectively denies
many of those residents access to the sites of opportunity in distant,
developing areas of the region. 5 This isolation is perpetuated not only by
the concentration of existing affordable housing in central cities and older
suburbs, but by the barriers to developing affordable housing in most
outlying suburbs. One of the most invidious barriers is exclusionary
zoning.
Governmental fragmentation—the proliferation of separate political
jurisdictions—facilitates structures such as exclusionary zoning laws. 6 By
prohibiting the development of housing that only the better-off can afford,
these local policies effectively exclude the poor and people of color from
the places that erect those policy fences. Together with fragmented school
districts that institutionalize the racial segregation of students, practices
such as exclusionary zoning unnecessarily burden both the affected
individuals and metropolitan regions.7
The harmful effects of sprawl and fragmentation on people of color have
been well documented. Racial segregation concentrates poverty, with or
without class segregation, which Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton have
demonstrated with their extensive research.8 Massey and Denton explain
that “racial segregation—and its characteristic institutional form, the Black
ghetto—are the key structural factors responsible for the perpetuation of
Black poverty in the United States.” 9
Together with overt racial discrimination, as where realtors steer Blacks
and Whites into segregated neighborhoods,10 the structural racism that
restricts affordable housing to ghettoized areas of the urban core intensifies
racial segregation and perpetuates poverty. To address both overt and
structural racism requires undoing segregation and making it possible for
people to live in places where they can access opportunities for jobs,
quality schools, and social networks. Making affordable housing available
throughout a metro region, rather than in segregated places distant from
opportunity, is a significant means to address segregation and concentrated
poverty.
In recent years, scholarship about potential reform has been increasingly
5. For a comprehensive review of the dynamics and consequences of racial residential
segregation, see Camille Z. Charles, The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation, 29
ANN. REV. SOC. 167 (2003).
6. Powell, Opportunity-Based Housing, supra note 2, at 193-94.
7. Id. at 194-95.
8. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 118-25 (1993).
9. Id. at 9.
10. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
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pessimistic, citing enduring local sovereignty over land use as a barrier to
regional cooperation, regional planning, regional housing, and regional taxbased sharing. 11 In response, this article reviews housing and land use
policies that several states have enacted to increase the availability of
affordable housing in metropolitan regions by countering sprawl and the
effects of governmental fragmentation. It illustrates these approaches with
case examples of the most promising approaches thus far attempted in the
nation’s metropolitan regions, and summarizes the empirical and analytic
research evaluating the effectiveness of these policies. The success of such
policies is measured largely by the extent to which they increase the stock
of affordable housing available to non-White and poor residents, and by
their potential to reduce residential racial segregation. The examples
presented are the most hopeful illustrations of approaches that states and
metropolitan regions can adopt to counter the inequitable effects of sprawl
and fragmentation.
This article recommends that land use and housing policies be marshaled
to reduce residential racial segregation and concentrated poverty. Such
policies should be statewide, or at least regional, in scope. Isolated policies
will encourage leap-frog development that in turn will promote both sprawl
and racial segregation.12
Secondly, state legislatures must adopt a coordinated policy approach.
This article uses Oregon’s comprehensive land use legislation as a
paradigmatic example of policies that effectively promote affordable
housing and decrease urban sprawl. Other regional government policies
that promote integration and reduce sprawl also serve as useful models.
The nine policies that I believe are necessary to promote stable
metropolitan living patterns are discussed in Part VI of this article.
With the adoption of a regional approach to governance of development
and the nine policies laid out below, metropolitan regions can work to
reduce sprawl and promote integrated communities. This Article addresses
the seriousness of segregation and the dire consequences it has on both
poor minorities and the middle-class Whites who are separated from people
of color. It then analyzes Oregon’s legislative scheme to promote

11. See, e.g., HAL WOLMAN ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE CALCULUS OF COALITIONS:
CITIES AND STATES AND THE METROPOLITAN AGENDA (2004), available at
https://www.brook.edu/urban/pubs/20040422_coalitions.pdf; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
GOVERNANCE AND OPPORTUNITY IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA (Alan Altshuler et al. eds.,
1999).
12. James A. Kushner, Smart Growth, New Urbanism and Diversity: Progressive
Planning Movements in America and Their Impact on Poor and Minority Ethnic
Populations, 21 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 45, 53 (2003) (citing Loudoun County,
Virginia as an example of an isolated effort that may propel leapfrogging).
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affordable housing and manage urban growth. Part III discusses the
necessity of inclusionary housing policies to promote mixed-income
developments, while Part IV examines the benefit of dispersed subsidized
housing in the context of the Twin Cities’ progressive siting policies of the
1970s and the Area Wide Housing Program. Finally, Part V discusses
positive integration measures, and Part VI sets forth the nine policy
recommendations noted above in detail.
I. THE PROBLEM OF SEGREGATION
Housing discrimination contributes to the racial segregation of the
poor. 13 Even today, real estate agents discriminate against middle- and
low-income minorities by showing them a segregated subset of the market,
while at the same time steering Whites away from communities with
people of color. 14 Discrimination against minorities also abounds in
mortgage lending. 15
Discrimination and segregation are not confined to the inner-city;
instead, they affect large parts of suburbia. For example, a recent study of
metropolitan Boston showed that nearly half of Black homebuyers were
concentrated in only seven of 126 communities.16
The way in which government agencies have located public housing
projects is also a particularly important cause of segregation. 17 Since the
13. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 8, at 102-09 (citing the Housing Discrimination
Study conducted by the Department of Housing and Urban Development).
14. See generally MARGERY A. TURNER ET AL., URBAN INST., DISCRIMINATION IN
METROPOLITAN HOUSING MARKETS: NATIONAL RESULTS FROM PHASE I HDS 2000 (2002),
available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/Phase1_Report.pdf; JOHN YINGER,
CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST: THE CONTINUING COSTS OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
51-61 (1995) [hereinafter YINGER, CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST]; George C.
Galster, Racial Steering in Urban Housing Markets: A Review of Audit Evidence, 18 REV.
BLACK POL. ECON. 105 passim (1990).
15. See YINGER, CLOSED DOORS, OPPORTUNITIES LOST, supra note 14, at 69-70
(analyzing HMDA data and finding stark racial differences in lending policy, even
controlling for differences in lender policy and individual economic characteristics of the
borrower); John Yinger, Cash in Your Face: The Cost of Racial and Ethnic Discrimination
in Housing, 42 J. URB. ECON. 339, 351 (1997) (“[M]inority applicants are more likely than
comparable white applicants to be turned down for a mortgage.”).
16. GUY STUART, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., SEGREGATION IN THE
BOSTON METROPOLITAN AREA AT THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY 5 (2000), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/metro/housing_boston.pdf.
17. See Robert Gray & Steven Tursky, Location and Racial/Ethnic Occupancy for
HUD-Subsidized Family Housing in Ten Metropolitan Areas, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION
AND FEDERAL POLICY 235, 249-50 (John M. Goering ed., 1986) (finding that HUDsubsidized rental housing was “concentrated in a relatively small number of minorityoccupied census tracts”); Florence W. Roisman, Intentional Racial Discrimination and
Segregation by the Federal Government as a Principal Cause of Concentrated Poverty: A
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1930s, housing authorities concentrated public housing sites in inner cities
and, since 1969, filled them with poor tenants rather than encouraging
mixed-income, racially-stable communities. 18 Some commentators have
theorized that if the federal government had not segregated public housing
or the tenants of public housing, mandatory busing to desegregate public
schools in the 1960s and 1970s would not have been necessary. 19
These forces of segregation and larger patterns of governmental
fragmentation 20 limit most of the Black and Latino middle classes, along
with poor minorities, to living in areas with increasing poverty and
diminishing opportunity. In 2000, about half of both the Black and Latino
middle classes had suburbanized in the one hundred largest regions.21
Because of housing discrimination, however, Blacks and Latinos who left
the city often ended up in at-risk, segregated communities characterized by
older housing stock, slow growth, and low tax bases—the resources that
support public services and schools. 22 Residents in these at-risk segregated
communities have high poverty rates and high concentrations of minority
students in the schools. 23 These realities decrease opportunities for middle
class minorities as compared with their White counterparts in education,
wealth acquisition in home equity, and employment. 24
Response to Schill and Wachter, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1351, 1367-69 (1995); Michael H.
Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy:
Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1290 (1995).
18. See Schill & Wachter, supra note 17, at 1293-95.
19. See, e.g., Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on
Metropolitan Society, 80 MINN. L. REV. 825, 854 (1996).
20. The Northeast and Midwest developed highly fragmented governmental structures
with hundreds of municipalities, and the structure that initially developed was largely
dependent upon property taxes. ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supra note 1, at 13033 (noting areas of fragmentation by numbers of local governments per 100,000 residents).
21. See MYRON ORFIELD & TOM LUCE, INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, MINORITY
SUBURBANIZATION AND RACIAL CHANGE: STABLE INTEGRATION, NEIGHBORHOOD
TRANSITION, AND THE NEED FOR REGIONAL APPROACHES 1 (2005), available at
http://www.irpumn.org/uls/resources/projects/MinoritySubn_050605wMAPS.pdf (“In the
nation’s 102 largest metropolitan regions, nearly half of the nonwhite population now lives
in suburbs.”).
22. See ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supra note 1, at 37-38. Forty percent of
metropolitan residents live in at-risk suburbs. Id. at 2.
23. Id. at 37.
24. In Chicago and Atlanta, for instance, the black middle class moved south to socially
and fiscally limited suburbs, while jobs and economic opportunity moved north. Id. at 14.
Additionally, the black middle class in Washington D.C. is moving southeast of the city to
Prince George’s County, one of the poorest suburban counties in the nation, while job
opportunities move west toward Dulles Airport and beyond. SHERYLL CASHIN, THE
FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN
DREAM 136 (2004); see generally MYRON ORFIELD, METRO. AREA RESEARCH CORP.,
WASHINGTON METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND STABILITY
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Because of their concentration in distressed, racially segregated cities
and inner suburbs, the majority of poor Blacks and Latinos live in poor
neighborhoods and attend poor schools; at the same time, poor Whites
more often than not live in middle-income neighborhoods and attend
Children who grow up in densely poor
middle-class schools. 25
neighborhoods and attend low-income schools face many barriers to
academic and occupational achievement. Studies show they are more
likely than children in mixed-income schools and communities to drop out
of high school or become pregnant as teenagers. 26 Long-term social
isolation, caused by racial discrimination, also leads to the formation of
gangs and other “oppositional social identit[ies]” in deprived communities
that are held out of the mainstream of opportunity. 27 In addition, racial and
social isolation leads to linguistic isolation, which limits employment
opportunities for poor minorities. 28 Neighborhoods with concentrated
poverty have very high crime rates, often many times higher than suburban
violent crime rates, and huge health disparities resulting from the
concentration of environmental hazards, stress, inadequate health care

(1999), available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/myron.pdf.
25. While there are some very high-poverty White neighborhoods in Appalachia and in
some older Rust Belt cities, more than seventy-five percent of poor Whites in the United
States live outside of high-poverty neighborhoods. See PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND
PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND THE AMERICAN CITY 61-62 (1997). On the other hand,
approximately eighty-two percent of poor Blacks and Latinos live in neighborhoods of high
poverty. Id. at 62.
26. See Jonathan Crane, Effects of Neighborhoods on Dropping Out of School and
Teenage Childbearing, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 299, 299-319 (Christopher Jenks & Paul
E. Peterson eds., 1991). Dropout rates of fifty percent or greater are thirty times more
common among majority-minority schools. See ROBERT BALFANZ & NETTIE LEGTERS, CTR.
FOR SOC. ORG. OF SCHS., JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., LOCATING THE DROPOUT CRISIS 5 (2004),
available at http://www.csos.jhu.edu/tdhs/rsch/Locating_Dropouts.pdf (“29% of the
nation’s majority minority high schools . . . have senior classes with 50% fewer seniors than
freshmen.”); see also CHRISTOPHER B. SWANSON, URBAN INST., WHO GRADUATES? WHO
DOESN’T? A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION, CLASS OF 2001
27-28 (2004), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410934_WhoGraduates.pdf
(noting that graduation rates are lower in majority-minority districts, as compared to
majority-White districts); GARY ORFIELD ET AL., LOSING OUR FUTURE: HOW MINORITY
YOUTH ARE BEING LEFT BEHIND BY THE GRADUATION RATE CRISIS 6 (2004), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410936_LosingOurFuture.pdf (“[W]hether a student
attends a school district with a high concentration of minority students and has little
exposure to white students in school is also a strong predictor of failing to graduate.”).
27. Signithia Fordham, Racelessness as a Factor in Black Students’ School Success:
Pragmatic Strategy or Pyrrhic Victory?, 58 HARV. EDUC. REV. 54, 56 (1988).
28. See Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn M. Neckerman, “We’d Love to Hire Them, But
. . .” : The Meaning of Race for Employers, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 203, 216
(Christopher Jenks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) (reporting that employers view job
seekers negatively if they cannot communicate in standard English).
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facilities, and poor quality food. 29 The increased need for services, the lack
of role models and social connections to higher education and employment,
oppositional cultures, and other problems of poverty make it even more
difficult for teachers to do their jobs in public schools. 30
All individuals—including poor people of color—benefit from living in
affluent and opportunity-rich neighborhoods with large tax bases and
abundant entry-level jobs. Integration has long-term benefits for people of
all races. Blacks, Latinos, and Whites from desegregated elementary
schools are more likely than their counterparts from segregated schools to
attend a desegregated college, live in a desegregated neighborhood, work in
a desegregated environment, and have high career aspirations.31 The vast
majority of law students attending some of the nation’s most selective law
schools report attending desegregated colleges. 32 Moreover, diverse
educational settings contribute to students’ ability to participate in a
pluralistic society. 33
II. COORDINATED LEGISLATION TO MANAGE URBAN GROWTH AND
FOSTER AFFORDABLE HOUSING
Oregon provides an example of a coordinated, statewide legislative
approach to restraining sprawl and providing affordable housing
throughout a region. Among other things, Oregon’s legislation requires
local governments to create comprehensive plans; prohibits exclusionary
zoning; requires growth boundaries in urban regions; and provides for

29. ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supra note 1, at 54.
30. See Gary Orfield, Urban Schooling and the Perpetuation of Job Inequality in
Metropolitan Chicago, in URBAN LABOR MARKETS AND JOB OPPORTUNITY 161, 162-72
(George E. Peterson & Wayne Vroman eds., 1992).
31. See JOMILLS H. BRADDOCK II & JAMES M. MCPARTLAND, CTR. FOR SOC. ORG. OF
SCHOOLS, MORE EVIDENCE ON SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES THAT PERPETUATE
MINORITY SEGREGATION: THE RELATIONSHIP OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND EMPLOYMENT
DESEGREGATION 3 (1983) (describing the results of a retrospective study that found that
blacks who attended desegregated schools had more confidence and more consideration for
jobs not traditionally held by blacks, and that both blacks and whites who attended
desegregated schools were, as adults, more likely to live in desegregated neighborhoods);
see also Amy Stuart Wells & Robert Crain, Perpetuation Theory and the Long-Term Effects
of School Desegregation, 64 REV. OF EDUC. RES. 531, 552 (1994) (“[D]esegregated black
students are more likely to have desegregated social and professional networks . . . more
likely to find themselves in desegregated employment, and . . . more likely to be working in
white-collar and professional jobs.”).
32. Gary Orfield & Dean Whitla, Diversity and Legal Education: Student Experiences
in Leading Law Schools, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 143, 152-53 (Gary Orfield ed., 2001).
33. See, e.g., id. at 159-66 (discussing the perceived benefits of attending a desegregated
law school).
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oversight and prompt, effective enforcement of land-use actions.
A. Land Use Coordination and Oversight: Oregon’s Comprehensive
Legislation
For over thirty years, Oregon has had the most comprehensive and
progressive land use management legislation in the country. Passed in
1973, the Land Conservation and Development Act (LCDA) provided for
“the highest possible level of liveability in Oregon” by requiring
“coordinated comprehensive plans for cities and counties, regional areas
and the state as a whole.”34
To implement the LCDA, the Oregon legislature created the Land
Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC), a seven-member
policy-making body appointed by the governor. 35 LCDC is empowered to
adopt by rule or by goal “any statewide land use policies that it considers
necessary” to carry out the LCDA, to review local government
comprehensive plans for compliance with LCDC goals and rules, and to
coordinate the planning efforts of state agencies to assure compliance with
the goals. 36 The LCDC appoints the director of the Department of Land
Conservation and Development, which serves as LCDC’s staff. 37
To provide for expeditious enforcement in matters involving land use,
the LCDA created the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), a threemember board appointed by the governor to hear appeals of land use
decisions by local governments, special districts, and state agencies.38 The
enforcement powers given to LUBA and the Department are discussed in
more detail below, following an overview of the LCDA’s comprehensive
planning requirement.
1. Comprehensive Planning
Each city and county in Oregon must prepare and adopt a
comprehensive plan in compliance with the LCDC goals, and must enact
land use regulations to implement its comprehensive plans.39 Once LCDC
has acknowledged a local government’s plan and regulations, the local
34. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.010(1) (2005).
35. § 197.030(1).
36. § 197.040(1)(c)(A).
37. §§ 197.075-.090. The legislation also established a Joint Legislative Committee on
Land Use pursuant to section 197.125, and an advisory committees of citizens and local
officials, appointed by LCDC, pursuant to sections 197.160-.165.
38. §§ 197.810-.855.
39. Any amendments or revisions of comprehensive plans or regulations must also
comply with the goals. § 197.175(2)(a).
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government must make land use decisions in compliance with its plan and
regulations. 40 State agencies also are required to carry out their land use
planning and activities in compliance with the goals set by LCDC, and in a
manner compatible with local governments’ acknowledged comprehensive
plans and regulations. 41
In the Portland metropolitan region, there is, in addition, a “metropolitan
service district.” Metro, as it is known, is an elected regional government
approved in 1978 by voters in Multnomah, Washington, and Clackamas
counties. 42 As required by the 1992 Metro Charter, Metro created a
Regional Framework Plan adopted in 1997 43 that, while not considered a
comprehensive plan, is subject to review by LCDC. 44 In addition, it
adopted an urban growth boundary in compliance with LCDC’s Goal 14
(Urbanization) 45 as required of all districts. 46
Proposed amendments to acknowledged comprehensive plans and land
use regulations implicating the LCDC goals can be made only if local
governments give notice to the Department of Land Conservation and
Development. Participants in the local government proceeding may appeal
an amendment, as may the Department, if it is not given notice.47
All “limited land use decisions” that a local government makes must be
consistent with its comprehensive plan and regulations. 48 A “limited land
use decision” is a decision pertaining to a site within an urban growth
40. § 197.175(1). LCDC had acknowledged all local government comprehensive plans
as of the end of 1986. See 1000 Friends of Oregon, An Overview of the History and
Structure
of
Oregon’s
Land
Use
Planning
Program,
http://www.friends.org/resources/overview.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2006).
Once
acknowledged, comprehensive plans are subject to periodic review by LCDC every five to
ten years (for counties with population of 50,000 or more or cities or metropolitan service
districts with population of 25,000 or more), or every five to fifteen years (for smaller cities
and counties). See §§ 197.628-.629.
41. §§ 197.180(1).
42. See, e.g., Metro, Land Use Planning, About Metro, http://www.metroregion.org/pssp.cfm?ProgServID=62 (last visited Feb. 12, 2006) (“Metro is the directly
elected regional government that serves more than 1.3 million residents in Clackamas,
Multnomah and Washington counties, and the 25 cities in the Portland, Oregon,
metropolitan area.”).
43. See
Metro,
Regional
Framework
Plan,
http://www.metroregion.org/article.cfm?articleid=432 (last visited Feb. 13, 2006) (describing the Regional
Framework Plan).
44. § 197.015 (defining the Metro regional framework plan).
45. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-015-0000 (2005) (citing urbanization as the fourteenth statewide
planning goal).
46. § 268.390. For a discussion of Goal 14 and the region’s urban growth boundary, see
infra Part II.C.
47. §§ 197.610-.620.
48. § 197.195(1).
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boundary (UGB) that involves the approval or denial of a subdivision or
partition, or the approval or denial of an application based on discretionary
standards regulating the physical characteristics of a land use. 49 Limited
land use decisions also may be appealed to LUBA. 50
2. Dedicated Oversight and Enforcement
The appeal process is an important part of the LCDA’s effectiveness,
and two features are significant. First, LUBA has exclusive jurisdiction to
review all land use decisions and limited land use decisions for which
review authority has not been granted to LCDC or the Department of Land
Conservation and Development. 51 Second, appeals to LUBA are handled
in an expedited manner.
Any person who participated orally or in writing in the proceedings of
the local government, special district, or state agency may petition LUBA
for review of a land use decision by filing a notice of intent to appeal. 52
Such notice must be filed with LUBA within twenty-one days after the land
use decision became final, or within twenty-one days after the person
received notice of a decision made without a hearing. 53 Within twenty-one
days of service of the notice of intent to appeal, the local government,
special district, or agency must transmit to LUBA a copy of the entire
record of the proceeding under review. 54 LUBA may receive briefs and
hear oral argument according to deadlines it sets, but it must issue a final
order within seventy-seven days of transmittal of the record. 55
In addition to providing for appeals to LUBA, the LCDA sets out
judicially reviewable enforcement order procedures. A person who
believes that a local government’s comprehensive plan, land use regulation,
limited land use decision, or other land use decision is not in compliance
with LCDC’s goals, or with acknowledged comprehensive plan provisions
or regulations, may request adoption of an enforcement order by the local
government. 56 The local government must issue a written response to that
request within sixty days of the postmark date. 57 If the requester is not
satisfied with the local government’s response, he or she may present a

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

§ 197.015.
§ 197.825.
Id.
§ 197.830.
Id.
Id.
Id.
§ 197.320(6).
§ 197.319(2)(a).
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petition for an enforcement order to LCDC. 58 LCDC may also initiate
proceedings for an enforcement order on its own motion. 59
Either LCDC itself or a hearing officer appointed by LCDC must hold a
hearing within forty-five days of the petition or motion for an enforcement
order; LCDC must adopt a final order no later than 120 days after the
petition was filed. 60 If LCDC finds that the local government is not in
compliance with either the goals or its own acknowledged plan or
regulations, it will issue an order requiring the government to take action to
bring itself into compliance. 61 As part of the enforcement order, LCDC
may withhold state planning grant money from the local government until
the government complies with the order.62
LCDC enforcement orders are subject to judicial review by the Oregon
Court of Appeals. 63 The court may reverse, modify, or remand the order
only if it finds the order to be unlawful in substance or procedure,
unconstitutional, invalid because it exceeds LCDC’s statutory authority, or
not supported by substantial evidence in the record.64 Oregon courts have
recognized and deferred to the broad authority that the legislature gave
LCDC. 65
Lane County v. Land Conservation & Development Commission66
presents an example of judicial deference to LCDC decisions.67 In Lane
County, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld an LCDC amendment to Goal 3
(Agricultural Lands) 68 and the Goal’s implementing regulations. 69 Lane
County argued that the amended goal conflicted with state statutes by
imposing restrictions on statutorily permitted uses of high-value
farmlands. 70 But the court held that LCDC did not exceed the scope of its
authority in “promulgat[ing] regulations imposing additional restrictions on
land classified as high value farmland, even if those regulations have the
effect of prohibiting uses otherwise permissible under the applicable

58. § 197.319(2)(c).
59. § 197.324(1).
60. § 197.328.
61. § 197.320.
62. § 197.335(4).
63. § 197.335(2).
64. Id.
65. See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (providing an example of such
deference).
66. 942 P.2d 278 (Or. 1997).
67. Id. at 285.
68. Id. at 284; see also OR. ADMIN. R. 660-015-0000 (2005).
69. Lane County, 942 P.2d at 284-85.
70. Id. at 282.
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statute.” 71
The planning requirement and the prompt review mechanisms are
significant foundations of Oregon’s comprehensive approach. In addition,
Oregon’s coordinated approach includes three features that are significant
policy tools for reducing sprawl, enhancing the availability of affordable
housing throughout a region, and connecting all residents with a region’s
opportunities.
These tools, discussed next, include prohibiting
exclusionary zoning; requiring metropolitan areas to set urban growth
boundaries; and linking development and public transportation.
B. Prohibit Exclusionary Zoning
The first step toward providing affordable housing throughout a region is
to eliminate policies that preclude development of affordable housing. The
most common legal impediment to affordable housing is exclusionary
zoning. Exclusionary zoning limits residential development to detached
single-family homes on large lots, and is common in suburbs. 72 When the
only type of residential development permitted by zoning laws is detached
houses on large lots, affordable housing siting and production becomes
nearly impossible.
Zoning laws typically are generated by local governments, as most states
have delegated their police power over zoning to local authorities. This
system allows each municipality to promulgate zoning laws that serve only
the perceived interest of that locality, without consideration of the effect of
their laws on the larger region. 73 A result of exclusionary zoning is that
many metropolitan areas have nearly no land outside the central city that is
zoned for attached housing. 74
Oregon’s comprehensive legislation prohibits exclusionary zoning
barriers to enable housing development throughout metro regions. This
aspect of the law is discussed next, followed by an illustration of a less
vigorous approach, the Massachusetts Low and Moderate Income Housing
Act.

71. Id. at 286.
72. Robert L. Liberty, Abolishing Exclusionary Zoning: A Natural Policy Alliance for
Environmentalists and Affordable Housing Advocates, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 581,
582-84 (2003).
73. Florence W. Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration: Lessons for the
21st Century, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 65, 94-95 (2001) [hereinafter Roisman, Opening the
Suburbs to Racial Integration].
74. Id. at 65-67.
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1. Oregon Prohibits Exclusionary Zoning
Because exclusionary zoning is an enormous barrier to the provision of
affordable housing, the Oregon legislature has declared that “[t]he
availability of affordable, decent, safe and sanitary housing opportunities
for persons of lower, middle and fixed income, including housing for
farmworkers, is a matter of statewide concern.” 75 Oregon’s legislation
includes provisions directed at ensuring sufficient residential development
to meet the needs for housing in general, and affordable housing in
particular.
The LCDA prohibits exclusionary zoning by enacting statewide
standards to which all local zoning provisions must adhere. Under the
LCDA, a local government may not prohibit, from all residential zones,
housing types such as attached housing, multifamily housing, manufactured
homes, or government-assisted housing. 76 With the exception of cities
with populations under 2,500 and counties with populations less than
15,000, all local governments must zone to provide for all housing types
determined to meet the need for housing within a UGB at particular price
and rent levels. 77
LCDC adopted nineteen statewide planning goals pursuant to its
authority under the LCDA to adopt “goals and guidelines for use by state
agencies, local governments, and special districts in preparing, adopting,
amending and implementing” comprehensive land use plans.78 Goal 10
(Housing) 79 requires that plans “encourage the availability of adequate
numbers of needed housing units at price ranges and rent levels which are
commensurate with the financial capabilities of Oregon households and
allow for flexibility of housing location, type and density.”80 The
guidelines 81 for Goal 10 recommend that comprehensive plans include

75. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.307(1) (2005).
76. § 197.312.
77. §§ 197.303-.307.
78. § 197.225. The LCDC’s statewide planning goals “express the state’s policies on
land use and on related topics, such as citizen involvement, housing, and natural resources.”
Oregon
Department
of
Land
Conservation
and
Development,
Goals,
http://www.lcd.state.or.us/LCD/goals.shtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
79. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-015-0000 (2005).
80. Oregon’s Statewide Planning Goals & Guidelines, GOAL 10: HOUSING,
http://www.lcd.state.or.us/LCD/docs/goals/goal10.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2006)
[hereinafter GOAL 10: HOUSING).
81. Many of Oregon’s statewide planning goals include non-mandatory guidelines,
which suggest how the given goal may be applied. Oregon Department of Land
Conservation and Development, Goals, http://www.lcd.state.or.us/LCD/goals.shtml (last
visited Feb. 13, 2006).
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inventories of buildable land and, at a minimum:
(1) a comparison of the distribution of the existing population by income
with the distribution of available housing units by cost;
(2) a determination of vacancy rates, both overall and at varying rent
ranges and cost levels;
(3) a determination of expected housing demand at varying rent ranges
and cost levels;
(4) allowance for a variety of densities and types of residences in each
community; and
(5) an inventory of sound housing in urban areas including units capable
of being rehabilitated. 82

In 1978, LCDC demonstrated 83 that Goal 10 would be enforced to
reform exclusionary zoning practices by relying on it to invalidate a City of
Durham ordinance that doubled the city’s minimum residential lot size.84
Goal 10 became the basis for statutes mandating planning and zoning for
multiple family housing, government-assisted housing, farmworker
housing and manufactured housing, and prohibiting local governments
from using home rule charters as the basis for excluding such housing. 85
The Land Conservation and Development Department also adopted
administrative rules implementing Goal 10. One rule applies statewide, 86
and the other—the metropolitan housing rule—applies to land within the
Portland metropolitan area UGB. 87 The metropolitan housing rule requires
all but the smallest cities within the Portland UGB to “designate sufficient
buildable land to provide the opportunity for at least 50 percent of new
residential units to be attached single family housing or multiple family
housing or justify an alternative percentage based on changing
circumstances.” 88
The metropolitan housing rule also specifies overall residential density
levels that most cities within the Portland UGB must maintain. These
density levels range from six or more dwelling units per buildable acre for
82. GOAL 10: HOUSING, supra note 80.
83. Prior to the creation of the Land Use Board of Appeals in 1979, local government
land use decisions and limited land use decisions were appealed to LCDC. Liberty, supra
note 72, at 592 n.72.
84. Id. at 591-92 (describing the anti-exclusionary intent of Goal 10, in an effort to
increase the diversity of housing types and prices).
85. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.303, 197.307, 197.312; Liberty, supra note 73, at 593-94.
86. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-008-0000 to 660-008-0040 (2005).
87. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-007-0000 to 660-007-0060.
88. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-007-0030.
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smaller cities, to ten or more units per acre for the city of Portland and
other larger cities within the UGB. 89 Although state legislation does not
impose specific density requirements, the Oregon Court of Appeals upheld
the metropolitan housing rule’s density requirements, finding that, absent
contrary statutory provisions, LCDC acted within its authority in
mandating density levels. 90
Implementation of Goal 10 quickly increased the availability of
buildable lands for housing in the Portland metropolitan region. Between
1977 and 1982, although land zoned for residential use increased by only
ten percent, the maximum number of buildable units more than doubled,
from 129,000 to 301,000. 91 The cost of vacant residential lots also
decreased, because the average size of vacant residential lots decreased.92
2. Massachusetts’ Response to Exclusionary Zoning
The Massachusetts Low and Moderate Income Housing Act
(“Massachusetts Act” or “the Act”), colloquially known as the Anti-Snob
Zoning Law, illustrates a less comprehensive legislative approach to
eliminating exclusionary zoning. 93 The Massachusetts Act streamlines the
permit application process for subsidized housing by allowing developers
to file a single application with the zoning board of appeals, rather than
requiring separate applications to the applicable local boards.94
Applications for subsidized housing are to be granted if they are “consistent
with local needs” for low-income and moderate-income housing. 95
The Massachusetts Act provides an incentive for jurisdictions to provide
some affordable housing by creating a presumption that requirements or
regulations detrimental to permit applications are “consistent with local
needs” in jurisdictions in which more than ten percent of housing is
affordable to low- and moderate-income households, or in which at least

89. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-007-0035.
90. City of Happy Valley v. Land Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 677 P.2d 43, 46 (Or.
Ct. App. 1984).
91. Robert L. Liberty, Oregon’s Comprehensive Growth Management Program: An
Implementation Review and Lessons for Other States, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 10367, 10379
(1992).
92. Id. (citing MARK GREENFIELD, 1000 FRIENDS OF OR., THE IMPACT OF OREGON’S
LAND USE P LANNING PROGRAM ON HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES IN THE PORTLAND
METROPOLITAN REGION 4, 17-18 (1982)).
93. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (2005).
94. § 21.
95. See § 23 (“If the Committee finds . . . that the decision of the Board of Appeals was
unreasonable and not consistent with local needs, it shall . . . direct the board to issue a
comprehensive permit . . . .”); § 20 (defining “consistent with local needs”).
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1.5 percent of all land zoned for residential, commercial, or industrial use
contains such housing. 96 The Massachusetts Supreme Court has made it
clear that this legislation gives the zoning board of appeals the authority to
override local exclusionary zoning practices.97 The Massachusetts Act is
also supported by a number of state subsidy programs for affordable
housing that promote mixed-income housing, rather than monolithic lowincome “projects.” 98
The Massachusetts Act has spurred considerable construction of
subsidized housing in suburban jurisdictions that were unlikely to have
such housing but for the Act. Since 1969, when it was passed, “18,000
affordable units have been built in at least 173 Massachusetts cities and
towns.” 99
But the little available evidence indicates that this new housing has
largely benefited Whites, and has “exacerbated racial segregation.”100
According to Paul Stockman, “[t]he [Massachusetts] Act makes no
distinction between family [housing] and elderly housing. 101 Most new
affordable units for the elderly benefited White residents who already lived
in the vicinity of the new housing. 102 Stockman further notes that “[o]nly
one-third of the units constructed pursuant to the Act have been family
Critics also question the passive approach of the
housing.” 103
Massachusetts Act, as it neither mandates affordable housing production
nor creates subsidies to encourage its production.104
Stockman, however, suggests that the Act’s passivity makes it less
controversial, and thus more durable, than more activist measures.105
According to Stockman, “[b]y making participation optional on the part of
developers, the Act avoids creating some of the disincentives that plague
other inclusionary schemes.” 106
Stockman concludes that the
Massachusetts Act’s passive approach “essential to the program’s

96. § 20.
97. Paul K. Stockman, Anti-Snob Zoning in Massachusetts: Assessing One Attempt at
Opening the Suburbs to Affordable Housing, 78 VA. L. REV. 535, 553 (1992) (citing Bd. of
Appeals v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 294 N.E.2d 393, 423 (Mass. 1973)).
98. Id. at 554.
99. Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration, supra note 73, at 73.
100. Id. at 74-75.
101. Stockman, supra note 97, at 557 n.147.
102. Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration, supra note 73, at 75.
103. Stockman, supra note 97, at 564 n.187.
104. Id. at 565-66.
105. Id. at 566.
106. Id.
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continued existence and feasibility.” 107
C. Urban Growth Management to Reduce Sprawl and Promote Infill
Urban growth management limits the amount of land available for
conversion to urban uses, which can reduce the harmful effects of
unrestricted sprawl. Growth management policies, by requiring careful
designation of lands available for development, also can lead to more infill
development in central cities and older inner-ring suburbs. Infill with
higher-end housing and commercial space has the potential to spark
renewal in financially depressed and resource-poor urban areas.
As part of its comprehensive land use legislation, Oregon requires any
metropolitan service district to adopt a UGB, 108 which Portland region’s
district, “Metro,” has done. 109 While some metropolitan areas in other
states have adopted some type of UGB, it has not been in the context of a
comprehensive legislative approach such as Oregon’s LCDA. This
comprehensive policy context is important to the effectiveness of a UGB
and is why the Portland region’s UGB is the model discussed in this article.
1. The Portland Metropolitan Region UGB
Goal 14 (Urbanization) 110 most directly implements urban growth
management by mandating UGBs. Goal 14 requires local governments “to
identify and separate urban and urbanizable land from rural land.” 111 To
guide local governments in setting and modifying their UGBs, Goal 14 sets
out seven relevant factors:
(1) Demonstrated need to accommodate long-range urban population
growth requirements consistent with LCDC goals;
(2) Need for housing, employment opportunities, and livability;
(3) Orderly and economic provision for public facilities and services;
(4) Maximum efficiency of land uses within and on the fringe of the
existing urban area;
(5) Environmental, energy, economic and social consequences;

107. Id.
108. OR. REV. STAT § 268.390(3) (2005).
109. Metro,
Regional
Framework
Plan,
http://www.metroregion.org/article.cfm?articleid=432 (last visited Feb. 8, 2006). See also supra notes 42-43
and accompanying text for an explanation of Metro.
110. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-015-0000 (2005).
111. Oregon’s Statewide Planning Goals & Guidelines, GOAL 14: URBANIZATION,
http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/goals/goal14.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).
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(6) Retention of agricultural land as defined, with Class I being the
highest priority for retention and Class VI the lowest priority; and
(7) Compatibility of the proposed urban uses with nearby agricultural
activities. 112

Land within UGBs is considered “urbanizable,” meaning that it is
available over time for urban uses. 113 Decisions whether to convert
urbanizable land to urban uses require a local government to consider the
following four factors: “(1) Efficient accommodation of identified land
needs; (2) Orderly and economic provision of public facilities and services;
(3) Comparative environmental, energy, economic, and social
consequences; and (4) Compatibility of the proposed urban uses with the
agricultural and forest activities occurring on farm and forest land outside
the UGB.” 114
As the following subsections discuss, the effects of the Portland region’s
UGB on affordable housing availability and residential integration appear
encouraging.
2. Effect of the UBG on Affordable Housing in Oregon
To determine whether the Portland region’s UGB expands affordable
housing options throughout the metropolitan area requires inquiry into the
UGB’s effects on the supply of housing and the price of housing. There
has been considerable research about price but nearly none about supply.
This section reviews these studies and then discusses the UGB’s role in
countering racial segregation. It also cautions against pairing UBG policies
with strategies to foster racial and economic diversity by preventing
displacement.
a. Effect on Housing Supply
There has been little empirical investigation of the effect of UGBs on the
supply of housing. A literature review published by the Brookings
Institution attributes the paucity of studies linking growth management and
housing supply to a lack of data on housing stocks, and to methodological
difficulties in distinguishing the impact of growth management policies
from other factors affecting housing supplies.115
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
ARTHUR C. NELSON ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE LINK BETWEEN GROWTH
MANAGEMENT AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY: THE ACADEMIC EVIDENCE 27 (2002),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/growthmang.pdf.
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The Brookings review cites one study by Rolf Pendall that found that
zoning exclusively for low-density detached homes reduces housing
supplies. 116 The restrictions in housing supply, particularly of rental
housing, reduced the growth of Black and Hispanic households from these
areas. 117 In contrast, Pendall found that UGBs were associated with shifts
toward multifamily housing, which may lead to increased racial
integration. 118
b. Effect on Housing Prices
There is vigorous debate over the effect of UGBs on housing prices.
This debate has focused on the Portland metropolitan area, Oregon’s largest
UGB. Critics of growth management attribute Portland’s rising housing
costs to its UGB. 119 Proponents cite other reasons for the housing price
increases, and argue that Oregon’s provisions facilitating production of
affordable housing mitigate the effect that UGBs alone would have on
housing costs. 120
Arguments that UGBs and other growth management policies will
increase housing prices focus on the cost of detached single-family
homes. 121 This type of housing development consumes the most land, and
thus is likely to be most affected by increased land costs resulting from
land-supply restrictions. What critics generally do not acknowledge is that
the higher density development encouraged by growth management uses
less land per unit and thus tends to produce housing that is less expensive
than detached single family homes. 122
The National Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC) calculates the
affordability of rental housing in every state, county, and metropolitan
statistical area in the country. 123 NLIHC’s 2003 statistics show that
116. Id. at 36 (noting that low-density zoning shifted housing stock from multifamily and
rental units, thus reducing the affordability of rental housing).
117. Rolf Pendall, Local Land Use Regulation and the Chain of Exclusion, 66 J. AM.
PLAN. ASS’N 125, 138-39 (2000).
118. Id. at 129 (noting that UGBs may encourage high-density, multifamily development
by raising land prices).
119. Liberty, supra note 72, at 598-99 (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF HOME BUILDERS, HOUSING
OPPORTUNITY INDEX: FIRST QUARTER 2002 (2002)).
120. Id.
121. Nelson, supra note 115, at 17.
122. Oliver A. Pollard III, Smart Growth: The Promise, Politics and Potential Pitfalls of
Emerging Growth Management Strategies, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 284 (2000) (“Promoting
more compact development and increasing residential densities can lower housing prices by
reducing the cost of land per unit of housing.”).
123. National Low Income Housing Coalition, Out of Reach 2003: America’s Housing
Wage Climbs, http://www.nlihc.org/oor2003/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2006) (providing 2003
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Oregon’s affordable rental housing situation was less dire than in most
other states.
NLIHC calculates each jurisdiction’s “housing wage,” which is the
hourly wage a full-time worker would have to earn to afford a twobedroom apartment at the area’s fair market rent.124 In 2003, the fair
market rent for a two-bedroom apartment in Oregon was $707 per month,
and the housing wage was $13.59 per hour.125 Oregon’s housing wage
ranked twenty-second highest out of fifty-two jurisdictions that included
the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. 126 These
numbers do not present the full picture of housing affordability unless the
area’s average wages also are taken into consideration. In 2003, Oregon
was one of thirteen states with a minimum wage higher than the federal
minimum wage of $5.15. 127 The result is that Oregon was one of only ten
states in which the housing wage was less than twice the minimum
wage. 128 This is not to suggest that access to affordable housing was not a
problem in Oregon in 2003, only that the problem was less severe than in
most other states. 129
A 2002 National Center for Public Policy Research (NCPPR) paper
takes the position that UGBs necessarily increase the cost of housing by
restricting the supply of land. 130 The NCPPR concludes that “[p]oor and
minority families pay a disproportionate amount of the social and economic

results).
124. National Low Income Housing Coalition, Out of Reach 2003, Introduction,
http://www.nlihc.org/oor2003/introduction.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).
125. National Low Income Housing Coalition, Out of Reach 2003: America’s Housing
Wage
Climbs,
Oregon,
http://www.nlihc.org/oor2003/data.php?getstate=on&state%5B%5D=OR (last visited Feb.
8, 2006) [hereinafter America’s Housing Wage Climbs, Oregon].
126. National Low Income Housing Coalition, Out of Reach 2003, State Ranks Based on
Two Bedroom Housing Wage, http://www.nlihc.org/oor2003/table9.htm (last visited Feb. 8,
2006)
127. See JEFF CHAPMAN, ECON. POLICY INST., EPI ISSUE BRIEF: STATES MOVE ON
MINIMUM WAGE 4 (2003), available at http://www.epinet.org/issuebriefs/ib195/ib195.pdf.
Oregon’s statewide minimum wage was $6.90 in 2003. Id.
128. See National Low Income Housing Coalition, Out of Reach 2003: America’s
Housing Wage Climbs, http://www.nlihc.org/oor2003/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2006) (providing
the data necessary to draw this conclusion). Only Alaska and Washington had minimum
wages higher than Oregon’s $6.90 in 2003. CHAPMAN, supra note 127, at 4.
129. In 2003, forty-four percent of Oregon renters were unable to afford a two-bedroom
apartment at fair market rent, and the housing wage was only slightly less than twice the
minimum wage. America’s Housing Wage Climbs, Oregon, supra note 125.
130. CTR. FOR ENVTL. JUSTICE, NAT’L CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, SMART GROWTH
AND ITS EFFECTS ON HOUSING MARKETS: THE NEW SEGREGATION iii-iv (2002), available at
http://www.nationalcenter.org/NewSegregation.pdf.
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costs of growth restrictions,” particularly increased home prices.131
NCPPR concedes however, that the cause and effect relationship between
site restrictions and rising home prices is “only a potential one,” because
growth management policies “tend to incorporate mechanisms for
loosening the restrictions gradually in the face of growth.” 132
Indeed, many studies suggest that the UGB’s effect on housing prices
has been small, and that other factors may account for the changes. Robert
Liberty cites data from the National Association of Homebuilders showing
that while Portland is among the least affordable cities in the country, the
median price of single-family homes is comparable to or lower than prices
in similar western cities, and its ratio of median family income to median
home price is more favorable.133 Michael Lewyn reaches a similar
conclusion after comparing Portland’s housing prices to those of other
western cities. 134
Similarly, Justin Phillips and Eban Goodstein found that Portland’s
UGB “has created upward pressure on housing prices, but the effect is
relatively small in magnitude.” 135 After comparing Portland housing prices
to those in other western metropolitan areas and conducting regression
analyses to measure the effects of various factors on housing prices,
Phillips and Goodstein attribute most of the increase in Portland housing
prices to the area’s economic growth, and to the alignment of Portland
prices with those of other western metropolitan areas. 136
Anthony Downs offers a more nuanced analysis. He refutes the claim
that UGBs inevitably cause home prices to rise faster. 137 Downs found that
home prices in Portland rose faster than in other communities in the region
only during the period from 1990-94, but not during the rest of the
1990s. 138 He also tentatively concluded that the UGB had a significant
impact on rising prices only from 1990-94, but not in the late 1990s.139 He
attributes the 1990-94 increases to a combination of job growth and the

131. Id. at v.
132. Id. at 10.
133. Liberty, supra note 72, at 598-99 (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF HOME BUILDERS, HOUSING
OPPORTUNITY INDEX: FIRST QUARTER 2002 (2002)).
134. See Michael Lewyn, Oregon’s Growth Boundaries: Myth and Reality, 32 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10160, 10162 (2002).
135. Justin Phillips & Eban Goodstein, Growth Management and Housing Prices: The
Case of Portland, Oregon, 18 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 334, 334 (2000).
136. Id. at 342.
137. Anthony Downs, Have Housing Prices Risen Faster in Portland than Elsewhere?,
13 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 7, 7 (2002).
138. Id. at 12.
139. Id. at 25.
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resulting buoyant consumer attitudes, relatively low housing production
during the early 1990s, 140 and Metro’s 1992 decision not to expand
significantly the UGB boundary. 141
Downs reasoned that the UGB did not influence home prices in the
Portland region during the 1980s because the impact of the UGB’s twentyyear supply of land was not yet felt, and because job and wage growth was
not rapid in the 1980s. 142 He found no simple relationship between UGBs
and housing prices, but suggested that Metro might need to expand strict
UGBs in times of rapid job and income growth to ensure housing
affordability. 143 Commenting on Downs’s paper, William Fischel argues
that Downs understates the propensity of UGBs to cause housing price
increases. 144 Fischel contends that, by comparing Portland’s housing price
increases only to those of other western cities, Downs downplays the effect
of UGBs because most western cities have growth controls. 145
While a UGB as a stand-alone policy may increase housing costs by
limiting the land supply available for development, other measures can
mitigate this effect and make housing more affordable. For example,
Robert Stacey credits the efficiency and certainty of Oregon’s development
permitting process—in particular the 120-day time limit for local
governments to review and make final decisions on permit applications—
with reducing development costs.146 According to Stacey, zoning and
policy changes leading to a “dramatic reduction in [the] average minimum
lot size in the Portland metro area” have also had a moderating effect on
housing costs. 147
Robert Nelson also favors this comprehensive approach to Portland-style
urban containment. 148 He argues that urban containment policies are the
wave of the future, making the relevant question not whether, but how
urban containment policies will be implemented.149 In a 2002 review of
the literature on growth management and housing affordability, Nelson and
his colleagues determined that growth management policies that simply

140. William A. Fischel, Comment on Anthony Downs’s Have Housing Prices Risen
Faster in Portland than Elsewhere?, 13 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 43, 45 (2002).
141. Downs, supra note 137 at 27-28.
142. Id. at 27.
143. Id. at 29.
144. Fischel, supra note 140, at 44.
145. Id. at 47.
146. Robert Stacey, Urban Growth Boundaries: Saying Yes to Strengthening
Communities, 34 CONN. L. REV. 597, 601-02 (2002).
147. Id.
148. See Nelson et al., supra note 115, at 36-37.
149. Id. at 35-36.
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restrict available land should cause housing prices to rise, but policies that
restrict land supplies while also facilitating housing production need not.150
In that review, Nelson concluded that (1) “[m]arket demand, not land
constraints, is the primary determinant of housing prices”; 151 (2) “[b]oth
traditional land use regulations and growth management policies can raise
the price of housing”; 152 and (3) if housing prices may rise under any type
of land use management, then the decision to be made is which policies
will mitigate both the adverse effects of urban growth and the adverse price
effects on lower-income households. 153
Significantly, Nelson recommends that UGBs in other regions be
combined with measures to facilitate development, as they are in
Oregon. 154 These coordinated measures include periodic review of the
assessment of land necessary for anticipated development, zoning for
higher density development, and expedited permit processes.155 Carl
Abbott agrees, suggesting that UGBs work best when combined, as they
are in Oregon, with other planning measures such as “public transit
investment, infill development, and affordable housing strategies.” 156
Similarly, while Nelson and Susan Wachter concede that growth
management programs like Oregon’s tend to increase housing costs,157 they
contend that such programs can be implemented in ways that do not
preclude affordable housing. 158 They argue that inclusionary zoning might
be more likely to succeed as part of a statewide land-use planning scheme
than as a local policy because, without a statewide mandate, local
communities tend to zone out affordable housing as a strategy to maintain a
high local tax base.159
UGBs may frustrate the operation of the “trickle-down” approach to

150. Id. at 34.
151. Id. at 33.
152. Id. at 34.
153. Id. at 35-36 (“Growth management programs can mitigate adverse effects, however,
by lowering the costs of providing public infrastructure, minimizing regulatory delays, and
prohibiting exclusionary zoning practices.”).
154. Id. at 34 (noting that Oregon’s growth policies “include both urban growth
boundaries (UGBs) to protect rural resource land and a host of strong measures to reduce
regulatory barriers in developing areas”).
155. Arthur C. Nelson, Comment on Anthony Downs’s Have Housing Prices Risen Faster
in Portland Than Elsewhere?, 13 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 33, 37 (2002).
156. Carl Abbott, The Portland Region: Where City and Suburbs Talk to Each Other –
And Often Agree, 8 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 11, 41 (1997).
157. Arthur C. Nelson & Susan M. Wachter, Growth Management and Affordable
Housing Policy, 12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 173, 173-74 (2003).
158. Id. at 174.
159. Id. at 181.
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affordable housing, a process by which the flight of the affluent to outlying
suburbs decreases home prices in the neighborhoods they abandon, making
them more affordable to those lower down the economic ladder.160 Yet,
while this process can make housing less costly, it undercuts the value of
homeownership as a wealth-generating mechanism in the increasingly
devalued neighborhoods. 161
c. Effect on Residential Racial Segregation
Black-White racial segregation has decreased in the Portland region.
The region is one of the nation’s least class-segregated metropolitan areas,
and it became even more economically integrated during the 1990s.162
These pro-opportunity trends may flow in part from the region’s growth
management policies. Limiting sprawl can help increase access to
opportunity by reducing residential racial segregation.
While sprawl may depress real housing prices, making home purchases
more accessible to Black residents, the same process that lead to this
outcome can also lead to greater racial segregation. Moreover, studies have
shown that Black homeowners, more than any others, are steered toward
real estate that actually loses equity value.163 These properties generally
are located in highly stressed inner-ring suburbs. 164
Matthew Kahn investigated the relationship between sprawl and Black
home ownership. 165 He found that sprawl reduces the Black/White
housing consumption gap by increasing the supply of land for
development, which in turn increases affordability. 166 Using regression
analysis, he found that Black households in highly sprawled metropolitan
areas occupied larger housing units and were more likely to own their

160. See, e.g., Tessa Melvin, Legislators Face Their Critics on Housing, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 1992.
161. Abbott, supra note 156, at 36.
162. TODD SWANSTROM ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., PULLING APART: ECONOMIC
SEGREGATION AMONG SUBURBS AND CENTRAL CITIES IN MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS 8-9
(2004), available at http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20041018_econsegregation.pdf.
163. See, e.g., Myron Orfield, Racial Segregation and Community Revitalization, 58
VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) [hereinafter Orfield, Racial Segregation and Community
Revitalization]; Joe T. Darden & Sameh M. Kamel, Black Residential Segregation in the
City and Suburbs of Detroit: Does Socioeconomic Status Matter?, 22 J. URB. AFFAIRS 1, 1011 (2000).
164. Orfield, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supra note 1, at 34-38.
165. See generally Matthew E. Kahn, Does Sprawl Reduce the Black/White Housing
Consumption Gap?, 12 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 77 (2001) (using 1997 American Housing
Survey data to show that black families are more likely to own homes in areas of sprawl).
166. Id. at 84.
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homes than were Black households in regions without as much sprawl.167
Kahn’s analysis contains its own counter-argument, however. He posits
two explanations for his findings. First, greater land supply in sprawled
areas lowers housing prices. 168 Second, “as jobs move to the fringe in
sprawling metro areas, inner-city housing stock that is far from
employment opportunities becomes cheaper.” 169 Kahn thus concedes,
“[w]hile housing opportunities for Blacks may improve with sprawl, the
quality of life for minorities could decline in sprawling areas if suburban
growth leads to less access to jobs and increases income segregation.” 170
If sprawl leads to increased racial segregation, then urban growth
boundaries could stem further segregation and perhaps promote racial
integration. Indeed, a recent study found that urban containment policies
decrease racial segregation. 171 Arthur Nelson, Casey Dawkins, and
Thomas Sanchez compared the 1990-2000 changes in the index of
dissimilarity—a common measure of segregation—for the Black
population relative to the White population among selected metropolitan
areas, both those with and those without urban containment policies.172
They found that, although Black-White segregation declined in nearly all
metropolitan areas in the United States, segregation declined faster, on
average, among regions with growth containment policies. 173
More specific to the Portland region, Nelson and Wachter found that
Black-White residential segregation declined in Portland at twice the
average national rate between 1990 and 2000. 174 The region’s Black-White
dissimilarity value fell fifteen points—from sixty-four in 1990 to fortyeight in 2000. 175 Across all metropolitan areas, Black-White dissimilarity

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 84-85; see also Arthur C. Nelson et al., Urban Containment and Residential
Segregation: A Preliminary Investigation, 41 URB. STUDIES 423, 435 (2004) (“[A]lthough
planning efforts to improve the supply of affordable housing may result in an increase in the
total number of affordable units per renter, these programs may also be perversely fostering
segregation . . . .”).
171. See Nelson et al., supra note 170, at 435 (“Generally speaking, metropolitan areas
with urban containment policies have seen average declines in segregation of approximately
two points over the period.”).
172. Id. at 429-31.
173. Id. at 431.
174. Nelson & Wachter, supra note 157, at 173.
175. Metropolitan Racial and Ethnic Change – Census 2000, Portland-Vancouver, ORWA
PMSA,
Data
for
the
Metropolitan
Statistical
Area,
http://mumford1.dyndns.org/cen2000/WholePop/WPSegdata/6440msa.htm (last visited Feb.
11, 2005) [hereinafter Portland-Vancouver Census Data].
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decreased nearly as much during the 1990s—twelve percentage points, to
fifty-two. 176 (Dissimilarity values of sixty or above are very high, while
values of forty to fifty reflect moderate residential segregation.177 Changes
in dissimilarity values exceeding ten points during a decade are considered
very significant.) 178
Black-White segregation, however, declined fastest in metropolitan
areas where the Black population shares were under five percent.179
Nevertheless, although the Portland metropolitan area had a small Black
population share in 2000—roughly three percent 180—it is desegregating
even faster than other areas with small Black population shares. The
region’s twenty-one point decline in its Black-White dissimilarity value not
only is more than twice the pace of the national average decline between
1980 and 2000 (nine points), 181 but it also exceeds the twelve-point average
decline for metro areas with Black population shares of less than five
percent. 182
In the Portland region, Hispanics comprised approximately seven
percent of the population in 2000 183 and were far less segregated from
Whites than Blacks. 184 Even so, Hispanic-White segregation is increasing
in Portland. 185 The Hispanic-White dissimilarity index for the Portland
region increased from twenty-two in 1980 to thirty-five in 2000. 186 Yet,
Portland’s Hispanic-White dissimilarity index remains well below the
average value of forty-nine (a four-point increase across twenty years) for
regions with Hispanic population shares of five to ten percent.187
In addition to having relatively less racial segregation, for decades
Portland has been “one of the most class-integrated metropolitan areas in
the country.” 188 The Oregonian, Portland’s major newspaper, reported that

176. Nelson & Wachter, supra note 157, at 173.
177. JOHN LOGAN ET AL., LEWIS MUMFORD CTR., UNIV. AT ALBANY, ETHNIC DIVERSITY
GROWS, NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION LAGS BEHIND 2 (2001), available at
http://mumford1.dyndns.org/cen2000/WholePop/WPreport/MumfordReport.pdf.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 4.
180. See Portland-Vancouver Census Data, supra note 175.
181. Id. (noting that the Portland metropolitan region’s Black-White dissimilarity value
fell from sixty-nine in 1980 to forty-eight in 2000).
182. LOGAN ET AL., supra note 177, at 4.
183. Portland-Vancouver Census Data, supra note 175.
184. Id. (showing the Hispanic-white dissimilarity indexes at thirty-five, and the blackwhite dissimilarity index at forty-eight).
185. LOGAN ET AL., supra note 177, at 17.
186. Portland-Vancouver Census Data, supra note 175.
187. LOGAN ET AL., supra note 177, at 14.
188. Abbott, supra note 156, at 24.
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“Portland and its suburbs became more economically integrated during the
1990s,” unlike most metropolitan areas. 189 As of 2000, households earning
less than the region’s median income constituted at least one-third of the
population in all but one Portland suburb. 190 David Bell, a partner at
Portland-based GSL Properties, attributes this economic integration in the
Portland region to the metropolitan housing rule’s requirement 191 that cities
within the Portland UGB zone enable construction of a substantial number
of multiple-family units. 192
3. Can an Oregon-Style UGB Approach Work Elsewhere?
Analysts disagree over whether Portland’s success can be replicated in
other metropolitan regions. Those who think not tend to focus on the
unique characteristics of the Portland region. 193 Some, however, suggest
that there may be limited replicability in somewhat similar places. For
example, William Fischel believes that Portland’s growth containment
policies probably cause higher housing prices, 194 which “look a bit out of
line.” 195
Believing Portland to be a rather unique case, Carl Abbott contends that
several unusual regional features made policies such as urban growth
restrictions and affordable housing development more palatable in the
Portland region than they would be in most other metropolitan areas.196 He
observes that Portland’s small non-White population, and its dispersal
throughout the metropolitan area—White flight to the suburbs—is less of
an issue there than in cities that have larger populations of color.197 Abbott
also believes Portlanders were more amenable to urban growth restrictions
to preserve the unique value of the nearby Willamette Valley agricultural
lands, a finite resource geographically limited to a small area by the
surrounding mountains. 198
In contrast, Henry Richmond is more optimistic about the replicability of
189. Betsy Hammond, Income Groups Intermingle, OREGONIAN, May 15, 2002, at A1.
190. Id. (“The Oregon figures show that households earning less than $50,000—roughly
the median income for the metro area—constitute at least a third of every city except Happy
Valley.”).
191. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-007-0000 to –0060 (2005).
192. Hammond, supra note 189, at A1.
193. See infra notes 196-198 and accompanying text.
194. Fischel, supra note 140, at 44.
195. Id. at 48.
196. Abbott, supra note 156, at 26 (“[C]ity-suburban politics have not revolved around
race and racial avoidance.”).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 28 n.8.
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Oregon’s land use reforms. He characterizes the Oregon land use scheme
as “prodevelopment,” 199 because development is encouraged within
UGBs, 200 and both the higher-density zoning 201 and the expedited
permitting process facilitate development. 202 Richmond views Portland’s
success as the result of tough policy choices that have garnered wide
support because they are in the region’s economic self-interest. 203 Thus,
any region interested in changing its land use policies to better support the
region’s economic well-being could choose to accept the benefits of a
comprehensive approach to urban growth management.
D. Development Linked to Transportation
Transit-oriented development is a complementary means to link lowincome residents and residents of color with job centers. It is included in
the plan for the Portland metropolitan area. Metro, the region’s elected
regional governing body, has a “Region 2040” development plan that calls
for growth over the next forty years to be concentrated in mixed-use
development in “regional centers” along transit corridors. 204 Rail transit
eventually will connect each of these centers to downtown Portland. 205
Some commentators believe that transit-oriented development better
meets community needs and is a more realistic goal than inclusionary
zoning. 206 Either way, given that non-White residents and the poor are
least likely to have access to an automobile, 207 transit-oriented
development is an additional approach for connecting people with
opportunities. 208 This type of development is well-suited to be part of a
comprehensive approach, as the Portland case illustrates. Thus, the

199. Henry R. Richmond, Comment on Carl Abbott’s “The Portland Region: Where City
and Suburbs Talk to Each Other – And Often Agree,” 8 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 53, 56
(1997).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 62.
202. Id. at 59.
203. Id. at 54.
204. Stacey, supra note 146, at 603-04.
205. Id. at 606-07; see also Abbott, supra note 156, at 30.
206. See Daniel R. Mandelker, The Affordable Housing Element in Comprehensive
Plans, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 565 (2003); see also infra Part III.
207. “In 1995, 24 percent of black households had no car, compared to 5 percent of white
households and 12 percent of Latino households.” STEVEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A. STOLL,
BROOKINGS INST., MODEST PROGRESS: THE NARROWING SPATIAL MISMATCH BETWEEN
BLACKS
AND
JOBS
IN
THE
1990S
14
n.4
(2002),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/Raphael_Stoll_spatial_mismatch.pdf.
208. Kushner, supra note 12, at 58-60.
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Recommendations section 209 includes James Kushner’s transit-oriented
development proposals. 210
III. INCLUSIONARY HOUSING POLICIES
Inclusionary housing policies are designed to ensure that affordable units
are included in new residential developments. They accomplish this either
by mandating that a percentage of units be affordable, or by offering
incentives for developers to include affordable units. Inclusionary housing
laws—also known as inclusionary zoning laws—can increase the stock of
affordable housing, and can alleviate the economic segregation common to
large, fragmented metropolitan areas.
In addition, the mixed-income housing developments produced through
inclusionary zoning can be more acceptable to neighboring residents than
traditional subsidized low-income housing developments, thus reducing
NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) resistance. Inclusionary zoning laws,
whether mandatory or incentive-based, permit these goals to be advanced
with little or no direct financial cost to governments and taxpayers.
A mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinance requires that all new
residential developments 211 include a certain percentage of units that are
affordable to households of a particular income level (generally defined as
a percentage of the area’s median income). 212 The share of units that must
be made affordable is the “mandatory set-aside.” 213 The laws generally
will require that the set-aside units be maintained as affordable units for a
period of at least ten years. 214 Because developers may be deterred by the
reduced profitability of housing projects including affordable units, these
laws usually include incentives to encourage development.215
A common incentive provision is a waiver of the zoning laws’ limit on
density levels, which allows developers to increase their profits by building
additional units on their property by permitting greater densities. 216 Other
statutory development incentives include local tax abatements, waivers of
permit fees, reductions in the amenities required to be provided by

209. See infra Part VI.
210. Kushner, supra note 12, at 58-60.
211. Exceptions are generally made for very small development projects containing only
a small number of units.
212. Robert W. Burchell & Catherine C. Galley, Inclusionary Zoning: Pros and Cons,
NEW CENTURY HOUSING, Oct. 2000, at 3.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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developers, and government provision or subsidization of infrastructure in
support of development. 217
New Jersey is the first of the following two case examples. Its “fair
share” doctrine 218 did not begin with an inclusionary zoning ordinance, yet
it has evolved to require that municipalities plan to meet their “fair share”
of their region’s low- and moderate-income housing. The second case is
Montgomery County, Maryland, which for three decades has used a
mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinance and density bonuses to expand
the availability of affordable housing throughout its metropolitan areas. 219
A. New Jersey
1. Mount Laurel and the New Jersey Fair Housing Act of 1985
New Jersey’s policies are the product of two New Jersey Supreme Court
cases—Mount Laurel I 220 and Mount Laurel II 221—and the New Jersey
Fair Housing Act (NJFHA). 222 While these policies do not explicitly
require inclusionary zoning, they have nudged widespread implementation
of inclusionary housing policies in New Jersey.
In 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court struck down the exclusionary
zoning ordinance of the small, but developing, township of Mount Laurel
in Mount Laurel I. 223 It concluded that Mount Laurel’s zoning ordinance
was contrary to the general public welfare clause of the New Jersey State
Constitution, and outside the municipality’s zoning power. 224 It also
approved an affirmative order requiring that every “municipality must, by
its land use regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an
appropriate variety and choice of housing.”225
The court announced, for the first time, the “fair share” principle. 226 It
ruled that a municipality “cannot foreclose the opportunity of the classes of
217. Id.; Marc T. Smith et al., Inclusionary Housing Programs: Issues and Outcomes, 25
REAL EST. L. J. 155, 155-56 (1996).
218. See infra notes 226-228 and accompanying text.
219. See infra notes 287-292 and accompanying text.
220. S. Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.
1975) [hereinafter Mount Laurel I].
221. S. Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J.
1983) [hereinafter Mount Laurel II].
222. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301 to -329 (2005).
223. 336 A.2d at 730.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 724.
226. Id. at 733 (“[E]very municipality therein must bear its fair share of the regional
burden.”).
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people mentioned for low and moderate income housing and in its
regulations must affirmatively afford that opportunity, at least to the extent
of the municipality’s fair share of the present and prospective regional need
therefore.” 227 The court decreed that “[t]hese obligations must be met
unless the particular municipality can sustain the heavy burden of
demonstrating peculiar circumstances which dictate that it should not be
required so to do.” 228
In reaching this result, the court reviewed the Township’s justifications
for exclusionary zoning, and found that they did not meet the heavy burden
of showing “peculiar circumstances” that would exempt it from the fair
share standard. 229 Significantly, the court required that municipalities
consider the impact of their actions beyond their borders. It announced
“that the general welfare which developing municipalities like Mount
Laurel must consider extends beyond their boundaries and cannot be
parochially confined to the claimed good of the particular municipality.” 230
Eight years later, in Mount Laurel II, 231 the court “established
guidelines and procedures that would ensure active and detailed judicial
supervision of local compliance” with the original fair share doctrine.232
To promote consistency, and to centralize Mount Laurel litigation, the
court also designated a panel of three judges to determine “fair share” and
to ensure that municipalities were complying. 233 The judges could declare
zoning ordinances invalid in whole or in part, or could mandate that
municipalities change specific sections of their ordinances. 234
The most significant change, however, was that a municipality no longer
complied with Mount Laurel simply by eliminating exclusionary zoning.
Instead, Mount Laurel II required each township to act affirmatively to
provide a “realistic” opportunity, a “likelihood—to the extent economic
conditions allow—that the lower income housing will actually be
constructed.” 235
Expressing dissatisfaction at the lack of progress in the creation of fair

227. Id. at 724.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 727-28.
230. Id.
231. 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
232. G. Alan Tarr & Russell S. Harrison, Legitimacy and Capacity in State Supreme
Court Policymaking: The New Jersey Court and Exclusionary Zoning, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 513,
515 (1984).
233. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 438-39.
234. CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES
65 (1996).
235. 456 A2d. at 422.
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share housing, the court also implemented a “builder’s remedy” applicable
to places that had not met their fair share of the region’s affordable housing
needs. 236 The builder’s remedy authorized judges to grant developers the
right to build high-density housing otherwise prohibited by local zoning
laws, as long as at least twenty percent of the development would be
affordable units. 237
The New Jersey Legislature responded to these Mount Laurel decisions
by enacting the NJFHA in 1985. 238 The NJFHA requires every
municipality in the state to adopt and implement a housing plan that
addresses its “fair share of the unmet regional need for housing affordable
to low- and moderate-income households.” 239
To remove the courts from what many saw as a legislative process, the
NJFHA created the New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing
(COAH). 240 Its role is “to determine municipal fair share housing
obligations, establish policies as to what types of municipal actions are
necessary to create realistic opportunities for the provision of housing
affordable to low- and moderate-income households, and, upon request, to
review housing plans submitted to it by municipalities.” 241 Although
municipalities are not required to submit their local housing plans to
COAH, the NJFHA encourages them to do so. “COAH approval of a local
plan gives the local ordinance a presumption of validity that may be
overcome in a court challenge only by clear and convincing evidence that
the plan will not meet the fair-share obligation.” 242
2. Effectiveness of the New Jersey Laws
A number of researchers and commentators have evaluated the impact of
New Jersey’s policies. These analyses find that its policies have increased
the amount of affordable housing. 243 The housing has, however,
disproportionately benefited Whites and moderate-income persons rather
than low-income persons, large families, and people of color. This section
236. Id. at 452.
237. Id. at 452 n.37; Note, State-Sponsored Growth Management as a Remedy for
Exclusionary Zoning, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1130 (1995).
238. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301 to -329 (2005).
239. Naomi B. Wish & Stephen Eisdorfer, The Impact of Mount Laurel Initiatives: An
Analysis of the Characteristics of Applicants and Occupants, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1268,
1271 (1997).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. State-Sponsored Growth Management as a Remedy for Exclusionary Zoning, supra
note 237, at 1135.
243. See infra notes 244-267 and accompanying text.
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reviews those studies and presents the resulting recommendations for
improving the New Jersey model.
Most studies of New Jersey’s fair share program focus on whether
affordable housing has in fact been produced in suburban New Jersey. For
example, a 1995 statewide survey showed that 15,733 suburban units were
completed or under construction; 1,982 vacated units had been or were
being rehabilitated; and 4,679 owner occupied units had been or were being
rehabilitated.244 These numbers fail to account for the affordable housing
built in communities that moved proactively to forestall Mount Laurel
litigation, nor do they include housing built as a result of cases settled
outside the court’s jurisdiction, according to Charles Haar.245 Haar points
out that tangible benefits, including changed behavior in suburban localities
and passage of the NJFHA, bear out the impact of the Mount Laurel
judicial intervention. 246
In contrast, “[r]elatively little research has been done on the
characteristics of the households who have applied for or occupy this
housing.” 247 One such study, examining the years 1983-88, found that
benefits flowed neither to the lowest-income households nor to people of
color living in the central city. 248 The study made the following findings:
 Approximately 5,087 low- and moderate-income units were
built or under construction.249
 Approximately seventy-five percent of these units were in
inclusionary developments, where a fixed percentage of units
are sold or rented at controlled prices, and the remaining twentyfive percent were in publicly-subsidized developments or
created by rehabilitating existing structures.250
 “The Mount Laurel units in inclusionary (market-provided)
developments were almost always offered for sale rather than
rental, were usually available without age restrictions, and were
skewed slightly in favor of being affordable to moderate-income
rather than low-income unit households.” 251 The publiclysubsidized units were more balanced and had fewer age
244. Wish & Eisdorfer, supra note 239, at 1273 (citing J. LAGOS, N.J. DEP’T OF CMTY.
AFFAIRS, 1995 SURVEY OF MOUNT LAUREL HOUSING (1995)).
245. HAAR, supra note 234, at 131.
246. Id.
247. Wish & Eisdorfer, supra note 239, at 1274.
248. John M. Payne, Norman Williams, Exclusionary Zoning, and the Mount Laurel
Doctrine: Making the Theory Fit the Facts, 20 VT. L. REV. 665, 669-70 (1996).
249. Id. at 669.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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restrictions. 252
 Based on then-completed inclusionary developments, the typical
residents were young married couples with children, drawn from
households that formerly rented or doubled up. 253 Minorities,
especially Blacks, were under-represented. 254
Wish and Eisdorfer’s 1997 study also reports disappointing results,
finding that African Americans and Latinos in New Jersey “are
disproportionately concentrated in a small number of urban areas and are
Meanwhile,
dramatically under-represented in the suburbs.” 255
employment opportunities over the past thirty years have increased greatly
in the suburbs and declined in the cities. 256 Wish and Eisdorfer conclude
that the New Jersey program “has not enabled previously urban residents to
move to suburban municipalities and has not enabled Blacks and Latinos to
move from heavily minority urban areas to the suburbs.” 257
Wish and Eisdorfer’s research examined the impact of Mount Laurel
initiatives (the court decisions, the NJFHA, and the COAH) in meeting
three judicial objectives:


To increase housing opportunities for low- and moderate-income
households.



To provide housing opportunities in the suburbs for poor urban
residents who had been excluded by past suburban zoning
practices.



To ameliorate racial and ethnic residential segregation by
enabling blacks and Latinos to move from the heavily minority
urban areas to white suburbs. 258

They reviewed New Jersey Affordable Housing Management Service
(AHMS) data on occupants of, and applicants for, recently constructed
low-and moderate-income housing, and concluded that initiatives to date
have at least partially served the first, but not the second or third
objectives. 259 As to the first objective, however, it appeared that large

252. Id. at 669-70.
253. Id. at 670.
254. Id.
255. Wish & Eisdorfer, supra note 239, at 1276.
256. Id. at 1277.
257. Id. at 1305.
258. Id. at 1276.
259. Id. at 1302. AHMS is a state agency that helps municipalities and developers
“administer occupant eligibility standards and affordability controls for low- and moderateincome housing.” Id. at 1281.
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households and very low-income households are under-served. 260
Specifically, the data showed that the Mount Laurel program had:
 Failed to produce housing for very low-income households.
More housing for moderate income households than for low
income households was produced, some in suburbs that used to
hold only expensive housing. 261
 Failed to facilitate moves from city to suburb.262 A higher
percentage of African-American households moved from
suburbs to cities than vice-versa. 263 Many of the moves were
lateral, with Whites tending to move from suburb to suburb and
racial minorities from urban setting to urban setting or into
predominantly minority suburbs. 264
 Failed to achieve racial or ethnic integration.265 New Jersey’s
suburbs remain predominantly White and there is no sign of
residential integration along racial and economic lines. 266
The study also revealed that there is a great demand for affordable
housing among racial-ethnic minorities; that racial-ethnic minorities were
still being shut out from New Jersey’s suburbs; and that they obtained
suburban housing less than half as often as Whites. 267 Overall, while
opportunities for affordable housing have been created, the opportunities
are flowing not to racial minorities, but to White homebuyers.
Others agree that the New Jersey policies have produced disappointing
results and suggest ways to improve their effectiveness. Yet many also
point to what has worked. For example, Bernard Ham, discussing Wish
and Eisendorfer’s study, concludes that “the Mount Laurel mandate of
producing realistic opportunities for the production of affordable housing
has largely been a failure.” 268 Ham concedes, however, that Mount Laurel
made “tremendous contributions” in reshaping the role of “local autonomy”
and home rule in race relations by emphasizing regionalism and fair share
concepts that, if enforced vigorously, could achieve the doctrine’s full

260. Id. at 1301.
261. Id. at 1302; see also Bernard K. Ham, Exclusionary Zoning and Racial Segregation:
A Reconsideration of the Mount Laurel Doctrine, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 577, 609
(1997).
262. Wish & Eisdorfer, supra note 239, at 1302.
263. Id. at 1303.
264. See Ham, supra note 261, at 608.
265. Wish & Eisdorfer, supra note 239, at 1302-04.
266. See Ham, supra note 261, at 609.
267. Id. at 608.
268. Id. at 610.
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potential. 269
In addition to recommendations for vigorous enforcement,
commentators have encouraged the New Jersey program to take racespecific measures. 270 John Powell contends that without such measures,
New Jersey “cannot adequately address the housing needs of all poor
communities.” 271 He explains that, in the Mount Laurel cases, the New
Jersey court shifted emphasis away from protecting the rights of
minorities. 272 The legislature, with the NJFHA, applied “the false premise
that race issues can be reduced to poverty issues”; failed to acknowledge
the relationship between race and poverty; and thereby left the issue of
residential segregation wholly to the local authorities’ discretion. 273
Powell argues that race-conscious fair share housing strategies for racial
minorities require policymakers to recognize “the interrelationship between
poverty and race in housing.” 274 Like “adequacy” suits in the education
realm, Mount Laurel “general welfare” suits call for inter-district remedies
that go beyond municipal boundaries to remedy inequalities and embrace
system-wide approaches. 275 While the New Jersey courts and legislature
recognize affordable housing as part of the “general welfare” that must be
provided for, it is necessary that racially integrated housing be implicit in
this understanding of “general welfare.” 276 According to Powell, “[a]n
improved Mount Laurel approach “would go beyond requirements of lowincome housing and would mandate pro-integrative measures.” 277 It also
should attend to the needs of very low-income households. 278
Others agree that the Mount Laurel approach has not alleviated the
problems of New Jersey’s cities. Peter Buchsbaum contends that the units
generated have mainly “helped lower-income suburbanites retain residency
in their areas rather than open up new opportunities for urban people of

269. Id. at 611.
270. See, e.g., John A. Powell, Injecting a Race Component into Mount Laurel-Style
Litigation, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1369 passim (1997).
271. Id. at 1369.
272. Id. at 1371 (“Making explicit reference to other characteristically middle-income or
temporarily low-income groups——the elderly, young single persons, and large families—
—the court reasoned that minorities were not the sole category of persons excluded by the
zoning scheme.”).
273. Id. at 1372.
274. Id. at 1373.
275. Id. at 1383.
276. Id. (“[I]n Mount Laurel, the general welfare clause imposed a duty to provide the
basic needs for housing opportunity. Implicit in this basic need for housing opportunity
ought to be the requirement of racial integration.”).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1383-84.
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color.” 279 He argues that production figures could be higher under a truly
comprehensive federally-subsidized program. 280 Like Powell, Florence
Roisman contends that the New Jersey program could be improved if it
directly acknowledged racial and ethnic integration as a goal. 281 Other
improvements would be to provide subsidies for low-income households
and to assure the accurate collection and reporting of data.282
Finally, John Boger recommends the implementation of meaningful
enforcement mechanisms such as gradual reduction of income tax
deductions for property tax and mortgage interest payments for all
taxpayers remaining in municipalities that decline to fulfill their fair share
obligations. 283 Boger surmises that a ten percent reduction in tax
deductions would prompt residents to press their local governments to
comply with their fair share obligations. 284 This mechanism could be
extended to cover federal tax deductions if the federal government adopted
a national “fair share” policy. 285
Boger does credit the Mount Laurel cases with exposing the power of
local laws to shape the economic and social characteristics of particular
communities and thereby state and regional populations. 286 Indeed, they
have had an impact by requiring a regional focus, and by introducing “fair
share” concepts applicable at a regional scale. With suggested reforms, the
New Jersey model could better meet the needs of communities of color and
low-income persons. The next case example illustrates a highly effective
inclusionary zoning law.
B. Montgomery County, Maryland
1. The Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit Ordinance
In 1973, Montgomery County, Maryland, a wealthy suburb northwest of
Washington, D.C., adopted its Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit (MPDU)

279. Peter Buchsbaum, Mount Laurel II: A Ten Year Retrospective, N.J. LAW., Oct. 1993,
at 13, 17.
280. Id.
281. Florence W. Roisman, The Role of the State, The Necessity of Race-Conscious
Remedies, and Other Lessons from the Mount Laurel Study, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1386,
1388 (1997).
282. Id.
283. John C. Boger, Mount Laurel at 21 Years: Reflections on the Power of Courts and
Legislatures to Shape Social Change, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1450, 1462 (1997).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1453.
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program—the nation’s first inclusionary zoning law. 287 The MPDU
program requires that any new housing development of fifty or more units
set aside 12.5 to fifteen percent of the units for households earning sixtyfive percent or less of the area’s median income. 288 As compensation for
building the mandated MPDUs, developers can receive a density bonus of
up to twenty-two percent. 289
Rental units must be maintained as affordable units for twenty years, and
owner-occupied units have price restrictions for ten years. 290 After ten
years, owners of MPDUs can sell their units without price limitations, but
half of their profits go to the county’s Housing Initiative Fund, which uses
the revenue to help developers purchase, build and rehabilitate affordable
housing. 291
From a racial equity perspective, a key feature of the Montgomery
County ordinance is the provision that a substantial portion of the MPDUs
go to the county’s public housing authority, to be made available to very
low-income households. One-third of the MPDUs are offered to the public
housing authority—the Housing Opportunities Commission (HOC)—and
qualified nonprofit organizations may purchase additional units, up to a
total of forty percent of all MPDUs. 292 Most of the units purchased by the
HOC and the nonprofits are maintained as rental units for low- and very
low-income households. As of 1999, there were 1,441 such units in the
hands of the HOC and nonprofits. 293 Unlike other MPDUs, which revert to
market rate after ten to twenty years, these will be maintained as affordable
units indefinitely. 294

287. See, e.g., KAREN DESTOREL BROWN, BROOKINGS INST., EXPANDING AFFORDABLE
HOUSING THROUGH EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: LESSONS FROM THE WASHINGTON
METROPOLITAN
AREA
5
(2001),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/inclusionary.pdf; DAVID RUSK, INSIDE
GAME/OUTSIDE GAME: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR SAVING URBAN AMERICA 184 (1999)
[hereinafter RUSK, INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME]; David Rusk, Inside Game/Outside Game:
The Emerging Anti-Sprawl Coalition, NEW CENTURY HOUSING, Oct. 2000, at 13, 13,
available
at
http://planningcommunications.com/nhc_inclusionary_zoning_viable_solution.pdf
[hereinafter Rusk, The Emerging Anti-Sprawl Coalition].
288. See BROWN, supra note 287, at 5.
289. Id.; Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration, supra note 73, at 78-79.
290. See BROWN, supra note 287, at 5.
291. Id. at 6-7.
292. Id. at 7.
293. Id.
294. See id. (“Once purchased, these units are set aside as rental for very low- to lowincome households, and will always be in the County’s affordable housing stock.”).
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2. Effectiveness of Montgomery County’s MPDU
In contrast to the results in New Jersey, people of color have been the
primary beneficiaries of the Montgomery County program. During its first
twenty-five years of inclusionary housing, Montgomery County produced
more than 10,500 affordable housing units, all integrated with market-rate
housing. 295 Nearly fourteen percent of these are public housing rental units
for low- to very low-income households. 296
In addition, people of color occupy eighty percent of the new public
housing rental units, and from 1991 to 1998 people of color accounted for
approximately fifty-five percent of the purchasers of moderately priced
dwelling units.297 Moreover, Montgomery County’s more than 10,500
MPDUs are scattered in almost 400 different subdivisions. 298 The local
housing authority purchased more than 500 MDPUs, located in more than
200 middle-class subdivisions. 299 David Rusk has described the county as
“one of the nation’s more racially and economically integrated
communities.” 300
Florence Roisman attributes Montgomery County’s success at racial
integration in large part to two factors. One is that public housing authority
purchases a large portion of the MPDUs, and its waiting list of very lowincome households includes many people of color.301 The other factor is
that purchasers of owner-occupied MPDUs are chosen by a lottery.302
Information about the lottery is widely distributed throughout the county,
with the support of fair housing groups and internal networking among
minority communities. 303
One weakness of the Montgomery County ordinance is that it only
applies to developments with lots smaller than one acre per unit, making
large-lot developers exempt from its inclusionary requirements.304 The
ordinance’s fifty-unit threshold size for developments is also generous.

295. See Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration, supra note 73, at 79
(“This ‘outstanding’ program has produced ‘more than 10,110 affordable housing units’ in
25 years, all well integrated with market-rate housing.”) (quoting Nico Calavita et al.,
Inclusionary Housing in California and New Jersey: A Comparative Analysis, 8 HOUSING
POL’Y DEBATE 109, 111 (1997)).
296. BROWN, supra note 287, at 7.
297. Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration, supra note 73, at 78-79.
298. RUSK, INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME, supra note 287, at 194.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration, supra note 73, at 107.
302. Id. at 108.
303. Id.
304. BROWN, supra note 287, at 5.
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Other inclusionary zoning laws, including an ordinance in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, apply to developments as small as ten units.305
After reviewing the inclusionary housing ordinances of Montgomery
County and three other counties in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area,
Karen Brown made several recommendations for improving their
effectiveness. 306 She advocates replication in other jurisdictions of
Montgomery County’s practice of putting a substantial proportion of the
new affordable units into the hands of public housing authorities.307 These
should be maintained indefinitely as rental units for low- and very lowincome households.
Brown also recommends that Montgomery County broaden the scope of
its law by applying it to developments smaller than the current threshold of
fifty units. 308 In addition, she would require large-lot developers, currently
exempt from the law on the theory that production of affordable housing is
impossible in such developments, to participate in other ways, such as
contributing money or land for the construction of affordable housing
elsewhere. 309 Finally, Brown suggests measures to make affordable
housing more attractive both politically and aesthetically, including support
for coalitions of business, development, and housing organizations aimed at
educating the public about the benefits of inclusionary housing. 310
C. How Policies that use Economic Proxies Can Promote Integration
Among the prominent statutory programs aimed at producing affordable
housing, only Montgomery County’s policies have made significant
progress in ameliorating racial segregation.311
Other states with
comparable policies include Oregon, New Jersey, California and Florida,
with their statutes that require municipalities to adopt plans for affordable
housing, and Massachusetts, with its Comprehensive Permit Law.312 These
policies may have decreased economic segregation, but they have had little
impact on racial segregation. 313 Some of these programs may even have

305. Id. at 24 (“In Cambridge, MA, for instance, any residential development with ten or
more units (new or converted) must make 15 percent of those units affordable to households
whose incomes do not exceed 80 percent of the area median.”).
306. Id. at 23-26.
307. Id. at 23.
308. Id. at 24.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 25-26.
311. Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to Racial Integration, supra note 73, at 71-72.
312. Id. at 69-70.
313. Id. at 71-72.
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exacerbated racial segregation by increasing opportunities for poor Whites
to relocate from integrated areas to predominantly White suburbs.314
Roisman argues that “economics cannot be used as a proxy for race, that
economic remedies cannot be used to solve racial problems, and that steps
in addition to the economic remedies are required to promote racial
integration in the suburbs.” 315 She does credit the New Jersey and
Massachusetts laws with bringing some low-and moderate-income housing
to suburbs that would not otherwise have below-market rate housing. 316
But racial integration and mobility have not been significantly advanced in
either place. 317
Roisman contrasts these programs with Montgomery County’s
inclusionary housing ordinance, which has furthered racial integration in
the county. 318 She attributes Montgomery County’s success at racial
integration in large part to two factors, the first being the public housing
authority’s control over a large number of the new affordable units.319 The
second factor is the use of a lottery to identify purchasers of affordable
housing, instead of simply placing the units on the market where
purchasers might be subject to racial steering, preferences for local
residents, and other factors that disadvantage persons of color.320
One lesson to be learned from Montgomery County is that policies that
are not explicitly race-based can advance racial integration if they are
carefully administered in ways that frustrate the typical operation of White
privilege. Thus, Montgomery County’s lottery for MPDU purchasers has
resulted in greater opportunities than the unregulated system in New Jersey,
which has delivered most of the suburban affordable units to Whites who
were already living in the suburbs.
Roisman also notes that, although economic remedies are an imprecise
tool to address racial equity, remedies that focus on very low-income
households, such as Montgomery County directing forty percent of
MPDUs to the public housing authority, are more likely than other
economic remedies to help people of color.321

314. Id. at 84-85 (describing the Massachusetts Comprehensive Plan in particular).
315. Id. at 72.
316. Id. at 77-78.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 77-79.
319. Id. at 107 (“One of the reasons for Montgomery County’s relative success is the
requirement that 40% of the MPDU units be offered to the local public housing authority.”).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 107-08.
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IV. DISPERSAL OF SUBSIDIZED HOUSING
Because subsidized housing specifically addresses the housing needs of
certain low-income urban residents, it is important that the units be located
throughout a metropolitan region. Policies to increase the number and
proportion of units available in a region’s suburbs help connect people of
limited means with opportunities dispersed throughout an urban region.
A successful illustration is the Twin Cities metropolitan region, which
adopted progressive policies in the 1970s that quadrupled the proportion of
the region’s subsidized housing located in the suburbs, and increased over
seven-fold the number of subsidized housing units in the suburbs in less
than a decade. 322 Between July 1971 and December 1979, the Twin Cities
suburbs’ share of the region’s subsidized housing stock jumped from ten
percent to thirty-nine percent. 323 The number of subsidized housing units
in the suburbs increased from 1,878 to 14,712. 324
A. The Twin Cities’ Progressive Siting Policies during the 1970s
The twin cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul are part of a seven-county
metropolitan region that has an appointed governing body, the
Metropolitan Council. 325 Among its responsibilities are comprehensive
infrastructure and land use planning for the region; planning, construction
and management of major metropolitan sewer infrastructure; and planning
The
and operating a seven-county metropolitan transit system. 326
Minnesota Legislature, through The Metropolitan Land Planning Act of
1976, 327 empowered the Council to serve as a housing authority, 328 and to
operate federally-assisted housing programs in any suburban community
requesting such assistance. 329

322. METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING ACTIVITY IN THE TWIN CITIES
METROPOLITAN AREA 6 (1980) (on file with author) [hereinafter METRO. COUNCIL, 1979
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING].
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. See Carrie Daniel, Note, Land Use Planning—The Twin Cities Metropolitan
Council: Novel Initiative, Futile Effort, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1941, 1950, 1958 (2001).
Created by the Minnesota State Legislature in 1967, the Metropolitan Council’s “main
purpose is to set regional policies as directed by the legislature and then to mandate that
other organizations implement the policies.” Id. at 1950-51.
326. See id. at 1951; see also Metropolitan Council, About the Metropolitan Council,
http://metrocouncil.org/about/about.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
327. MINN. STAT. § 473.851-.871 (2005).
328. See, e.g., Daniel, supra note 325, at 1952-53 (describing the Metropolitan Council’s
land planning role).
329. See, e.g., METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 322, at 33
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A number of factors, including the availability of federal monies for
subsidized housing construction and conversion, 330 contributed to the
dramatic increase in the number and proportion of subsidized housing units
in the Twin Cities suburbs during the 1970s. Yet, the proactive housing
policies adopted by the Metropolitan Council in 1971 331 made it possible
for the Twin Cities region to leverage effectively those federal funds when
they became available beginning in 1974. The Metropolitan Council’s
policies, which were part of an effort to expand the stock of subsidized
housing in the suburbs, contributed to a substantial increase in the number
and share of units available in the suburbs between 1971 and 1974. 332
Under Policy 13 (now Policy 39), the Metropolitan Council used its A95 authority to review applications for federal grants and implement a
housing policy encouraging subsidized housing development in the
suburbs. 333 When reviewing local governments’ applications for federal
funds, the Council recommended priority in funding based on how well a
local jurisdiction had previously done in providing low- and moderateincome housing opportunities. 334
The other 1971 Council policy that hastened suburbanization of
affordable housing was a regional subsidized housing allocation plan that
gave priority in federal housing funds to cities that had already had
provided low- and moderate-income housing opportunities. 335 This
allocation plan and the Council’s Policy 13 deserve most, if not all, of the
credit for progress toward the suburbanization of low- and moderateincome housing in the Twin Cities from 1971 until the advent of Section 8

(describing Section 8, the federal government’s program for “assisting lower-income
families to secure decent, safe and sanitary housing”).
330. Id.
331. See infra notes 333-337 and accompanying text (describing the policies adopted by
the Metropolitan Council).
332. See METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 322, at 6 (noting an
increase of 2,721 units from 1,878 to 4,599, which represented an eight percent jump in the
share of subsidized housing units located in the suburbs).
333. BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE HOUSING
OPPORTUNITY P LAN (AHOP) PROGRAM, FINAL REPORT, VOLUME TWO: CASE STUDY
NARRATIVES III-2, III-3 (1979) (on file with author) [hereinafter BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS.,
VOLUME TWO]; METRO. COUNCIL, AN OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL HOUSING POLICY AND
IMPLEMENTATION: 1967-2002 1 (2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter METRO. COUNCIL,
AN OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL HOUSING POLICY]. The term “A-95 authority” comes from the
authority granted by the Office of Management and Budget in its Circular A-95. METRO.
COUNCIL, AN OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL HOUSING POLICY, supra, at 1.
334. METRO. COUNCIL, AN OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL HOUSING POLICY, supra note 333, at
1.
335. See id. at 2; see also BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., VOLUME TWO, supra note 333, at
III-3.

ORFIELD_CHRISTENSEN

144

2/3/2011 10:19 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIII

in 1974. 336 During those three years, forty-one percent of new subsidized
housing was located in the suburbs, and the cumulative suburban share of
the region’s subsidized housing increased from ten to eighteen percent. 337
In the wake of a 1973 federal moratorium on public housing
construction, 338 virtually all of the new subsidized housing units from 1973
through 1979 were funded through the Section 8 program. 339 Section 8,
established by the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act,
facilitated the transfer of subsidized housing to the suburbs by providing
renters with the expanded residential choice and mobility of rent
certificates and vouchers.340 It also funded small developments and mixedincome developments that would better fit into the suburban landscape than
did large housing projects. Under the existing Section 8 program, eligible
families received certificates or vouchers for rent subsidies in existing
rental units. 341 Under the Section 8 New Construction program (which was
repealed by the Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983), private
owners received Section 8 funding to build and own new rental units. 342
The Twin Cities regions’ experienced a net gain of 12,255 subsidized
housing units between 1974 to 1979, due almost entirely to Section 8
units. 343 Fifty-four percent were new construction, and forty-six percent
were existing units subsidized through Section 8 certificates and
vouchers. 344 From 1974 to 1979, the Twin Cities metropolitan area gained
7,300 Section 8 New Construction units and 6,334 Section 8 Existing units,
for a total of 13,634 new Section 8 units. 345
During 1975 and 1976, with the Section 8 programs in place, the
suburbanization of Twin Cities subsidized housing accelerated. Over these
two years, sixty-two percent of new subsidized housing activity was in the
suburbs; the suburbs’ share of the region’s subsidized housing jumped ten

336. See infra notes 339-342 for a description of the Section 8 program.
337. BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., VOLUME TWO, supra note 333, at III-15 to III-16.
338. Charles J. Orlebeke, The Evolution of Low-Income Housing Policy, 1949 to 1999, 11
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 489, 490 (2000) (noting that in January 1973, President Nixon
“abruptly imposed a moratorium on all new subsidy commitments”).
339. METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 322, at 4 tbl.2.
340. Id. at 33.
341. Id. (noting that eligible families pay no more than twenty-five percent of their
income toward rent—a housing authority pays the difference); Janet L. Pershing, METRO.
COUNCIL, CHANGES IN THE SUBSIDIZED HOUSING MARKET IN THE TWIN CITIES
METROPOLITAN AREA 1980-1989 8 (1990) (describing the use of certificates and vouchers in
the Twin Cities area).
342. METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 322, at 33.
343. Id. at 6 tbl.4.
344. Id. at 14.
345. Id. at 3 tbl.1, 14.
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percentage points to twenty-eight percent. 346 During the 1970s, the annual
distribution of new subsidized units to the suburbs increased from thirty-six
percent in 1971 to sixty-nine percent in 1979, with a high of seventy-three
percent in 1977. 347
The Council’s progressive policies also contributed to the region’s
success in the late 1970s. In 1976, HUD initiated the Areawide Housing
Opportunity Plan (AHOP) to recognize and build upon the fair-share
housing plans implemented by several area-wide planning agencies around
the country. 348 The Metropolitan Council was one of the several visionary
agencies that already had a regional fair-share plan in place. 349 As a result,
the Twin Cities was one of the first regions to get HUD approval of its
AHOP, and therefore to receive additional HUD funding.
The AHOP program provided incentives for fair-share development
through bonus Section 8 funding. 350 In the first few years of the AHOP
program, the Metropolitan Council received more than $7 million in
Section 8 bonus funding, all of which the Council distributed in the
suburbs. 351 The program accelerated subsidized housing development in
the suburbs. In 1977, the Twin Cities suburbs got seventy-three percent of
the region’s new subsidized housing, and the suburbs’ cumulative share of
the subsidized housing increased from twenty-eight to thirty-four
percent. 352 In 1978 and 1979, the suburban share of new subsidized
housing was sixty and sixty-nine percent, respectively, increasing the
suburbs’ cumulative share to thirty-nine percent by 1979. 353
B. Results of the Area-Wide Housing Opportunity Plan
Even among the most progressive metropolitan regions, the Twin Cities
stands out for its success in shifting subsidized housing from central cities
to suburbs. This conclusion is based in part on a 1979 report in which
Berkeley Policy Associates attributes the Twin Cities’ success in
implementing the AHOP program in part to the Metropolitan Council’s
leadership in developing and enforcing its regional housing allocation

346.
III-16.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

Id. at 6 tbl.3; BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., VOLUME TWO, supra note 333, at III-15 to
METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 322, at 6 tbl.3.
BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., VOLUME TWO, supra note 333, at v.
Id. at III-2 to III-3.
Id. at III-20, III-31.
Id. at III-14, III-20.
METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 322, at 6 tbls.3 & 4.
Id.
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plan. 354 Other factors include the region’s progressive tradition, its small
population of people of color, and local market conditions that made
subsidized housing attractive to developers. 355
The Berkeley report analyzes the success of the AHOP program in the
first five regions to qualify for AHOP bonus funding in the first two years
of the program. 356 The Berkeley report examines the following regions:
the Twin Cities, Los Angeles, Puget Sound (Seattle), Miami Valley
(Dayton), and Washington, D.C. (which includes Alexandria, four Virginia
counties, and two Maryland counties).357 The data for the Los Angeles
region are not tabulated in a way that allows meaningful comparison to the
Twin Cities numbers, but comparisons with the other regions are possible.
Between January 1975 to February 1979, the Puget Sound suburbs’
share of the region’s subsidized housing increased four percentage points,
to twenty-five percent. 358 In the Twin Cities, the suburban share of
subsidized housing increased nineteen percentage points, to thirty-seven
percent, during approximately the same period (July 1974 through
December 1978). 359 The Puget Sound suburbs added 3,026 new units,360
contrasted with 8,160 in the Twin Cities.361 In the Washington, D.C.
region, the suburban share of the region’s subsidized housing increased
eight percentage points, to forty-eight percent, between October 1971 and
April 1979. 362 During the comparable period (July 1971 through
December 1978), the suburbs’ share in the Twin Cities increased twentyseven percentage points, to thirty-seven percent. 363 The Washington, D.C.
region added 8,508 new subsidized units in the suburbs, 364 contrasted with
10,881 in the Twin Cities suburbs. 365
In the Miami Valley region, the suburban share of the region’s
subsidized housing increased eleven percentage points, to thirty-seven
percent between 1975 and 1979. 366 During the same period, the suburban
share in the Twin Cities also increased eleven percentage points, to thirty-

354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., VOLUME TWO, supra note 333, at III-1, III-20.
Id.
See generally id.
Id. at v.
Id. at I-15 tbl.6.
METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 322, at 6 tbl.4.
BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., VOLUME TWO, supra note 333, at I-15 tbl.6.
METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 322, at 6 tbl.4.
BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., VOLUME TWO, supra note 333, at II-26 tbl.6.
METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 322, at 6 tbl.4.
BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., VOLUME TWO, supra note 333, at II-26 tbl.6.
METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 322, at 6 tbl.4.
BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., VOLUME TWO, supra note 333, at IV-23.
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nine percent. 367 The number of new suburban units reported in the Miami
Valley region was much lower than the number in the Twin Cities,368 but
this comparison is not helpful. Not only did the Miami Valley region have
less than half the population of the Twin Cities, but the report includes
Section 8 Existing units in the total for the Twin Cities, but not for Miami
Valley. 369
As the Twin Cities example illustrates, progressive policies at the
regional scale can increase both the number and suburban share of
affordable housing units by focusing their development in suburban
locations. Such policies, when enacted at a regional scale, can position a
metropolitan region to leverage additional resources for expanding the
stock of housing for its residents, better connecting them with opportunities
throughout the region. In the context of contemporary programs, this can
be done by siting units developed under the Low Income Housing Tax
Credit 370 in locations away from areas of concentrated poverty and racial
segregation.
V. POSITIVE INTEGRATION MEASURES
In many metropolitan areas, residential racial segregation is deeply
entrenched. Even when people of color relocate from central cities to
suburbs, the same White flight that isolated central city residents is often
replicated in the suburbs. When the population of color in a suburb,
typically an older, inner-ring suburb, reaches a “tipping point,” White flight
quickly can resegregate the area as the White population plummets.
Proactive integrative measures are necessary to accomplish desegregation,
as well as to prevent resegregation.
Recognizing the value of neighborhood stability, and the importance of
racial integration, some communities have taken proactive steps to promote
and preserve diversity. Two successful examples are discussed next.
A. Shaker Heights, Ohio
Shaker Heights is a suburb on the southeast border of Cleveland. Since
the 1960s, it has made extraordinary efforts to address racial segregation in
its community, and to promote integration of its neighborhoods and its
schools. One commentator observed in the early 1990s that, “Shaker

367. METRO. COUNCIL, 1979 SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 322, at 6 tbl.4.
368. BERKELEY POLICY ASSOCS., VOLUME TWO, supra note 333, at IV-23 tbl.10.
369. Id.
370. 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2005); see also Orfield, Racial Segregation and Community
Revitalization, supra note 163.
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Heights is one of the few examples of sustained suburban racial integration
in the United States.” 371
According to a report by the Institute on Race and Poverty,
Shaker Heights officials have taken a systemic approach to the integration
of their community, recognizing, for example, that housing patterns and
school segregation are interrelated and should be addressed together. The
school board and the school system administration have long been
involved in the city’s efforts to integrate its neighborhoods. 372

In 1964, the mayor, the city council, and the board of education created
the Shaker Citizens’ Advisory Commission, to address community issues
like housing segregation. 373 That same year, the Commission banned “the
display of for-sale signs on front lawns to stave off the ‘blockbusting’ that
According to the
had contributed to resegregation elsewhere.”374
aforementioned Institute on Race and Poverty report, “the board of
education also funded and sent representatives to the governing board of
the Shaker Housing Office . . . to promote housing integration.”375
Moreover, in 1968, the school board employed a community worker “to
recruit White residents to buy and rent homes in the Moreland elementary
school district, which was on the way to becoming an all-Black
neighborhood.” 376
In 1985, the city government and the school system also joined together
to form the Fund for the Future of Shaker Heights, “an innovative incentive
program encouraging residential integration.” 377 The Fund uses private
donations to “provide[] low-cost mortgage loans of $3000 and $6000 to
Whites who move into a neighborhood that is more than 50% Black, and to
Blacks moving to a neighborhood that is more than 90% White.378
According to Donald L. DeMarco, director of community services for the
city, “[i]f you look at [the Fund] as a housing program, you say yes, maybe
this is something that a board of education should not be involved with,
[but] it actually is an integrative organization more than a housing

371. W. DENNIS KEATING, THE SUBURBAN RACIAL DILEMMA: HOUSING AND
NEIGHBORHOODS 112 (1994).
372. SUSAN HARTIGAN ET AL., INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, RACISM AND THE OPPORTUNITY
DIVIDE ON LONG ISLAND 26 (2002), available at http://www.eraseracismny.org/downloads/
reports/IRP_Full_Report_with_Maps.pdf.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. (citing INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, STUDENT VOICES ACROSS THE SEPECTRUM:
THE EDUCATIONAL INTEGRATION INITIATIVES PROJECT 78-79 (2000)).
377. Id. at 27.
378. Id.
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organization.” 379
Having city governments and school systems work together to promote
integrated communities is one important technique for developing and
maintaining stably integrated communities.
B. South Orange – Maplewood, New Jersey
The Fund for an Open Society (“Open Society”), an organization
dedicated to producing racially and ethnically integrated communities,
helps several communities implement policies similar to those employed in
Shaker Heights. 380 Open Society has worked with South Orange and
Maplewood, New Jersey since 1996 to create an inclusive community. 381
“South Orange and Maplewood are two middle-class suburbs which
share a school district.” 382 In the mid-1990s, a drop in property values,
combined with increased racial diversity in the local housing market, led
some community leaders to consider that White homebuyers avoided South
Orange and Maplewood in the fear that the communities would
resegregate. 383 These community leaders decided to take “a race-conscious
approach to community-building.” 384 With help from Open Society, these
leaders undertook “a comprehensive, multi-pronged intentional integration
initiative” with two central objectives: (i) “[b]alance the demand for
housing among whites and people of color;” and (ii) “[b]alance the
participation of people of color and whites in the power structure and civic
life of the community.” 385
With funding from the two municipal governments, community leaders
formed a nonprofit organization, the South Orange/Maplewood
Community Coalition on Race (the “Coalition”), “to implement the

379. Id. (citing Peter Schmidt, Courts, School Boards Testing Strategies To Integrate
Neighborhoods, Schools, EDUC. WK., Feb. 26, 1992).
380. See FUND FOR AN OPEN SOC’Y, RACIAL AND ETHNIC INTEGRATION: BUILDING EQUITY
AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL 2 (2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter FUND FOR AN OPEN
SOC’Y, RACIAL AND ETHNIC INTEGRATION] (describing Open Society as “the nation’s only
organization whose mission is to promote racially and ethnically integrated communities”);
Fund for an Open Society, How We Work, http://www.opensoc.org/aboutus/work.html (last
visited Feb. 20, 2006) (describing the Open Society’s desire to create a “unitary housing
market, where people of more than one race are competing together for available housing”).
381. See, e.g., Fund for an Open Society, Demonstrable Results: A Case Study,
http://www.opensoc.org/aboutus/work2.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
382. See FUND FOR AN OPEN SOC’Y, RACIAL AND ETHNIC INTEGRATION, supra note 380, at
2.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
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intentional integration program.” 386 The Coalition markets the community
to “people who were underrepresented in the housing market, which in this
case was whites. 387 The Coalition ran advertisements in local newspapers
“positioning South Orange and Maplewood as attractive communities for
families seeking a suburban lifestyle and strong public schools, but wishing
to live in a cosmopolitan neighborhood.” 388 The Coalition also offers
potential homebuyers tours designed “to subvert potential steering by real
estate agents.” 389 Moreover, the Coalition communicates with real estate
agents to make them “aware of all the positive aspects of the
communities.” 390 Furthermore, the Coalition created a fair housing
organization (the Morris, Union, Sussex, and Essex Fair Housing Council)
that conducts paired testing 391 “to identify whether discrimination and
steering exist in the housing market.” 392
The Coalition also offers financial incentives to homebuyers
participating in the integration initiative: “Whites and people of color . . .
[who] purchase[d] homes in parts of the community where their race is
under-represented . . . [could obtain] a second mortgage of $10,000 at a
significantly reduced interest rate.” 393
In the broader community, the Coalition pursues an “integration culture”
by “encouraging residents’ comfort level with talking openly about race, by
building inter-racial trust and relationships, and by working to address
potential problems.” 394 It has sponsored a variety of cultural, social and
educational events.395
Since its inception in 1996, the Coalition has made significant progress
toward “creating and sustaining intentional integration.” 396 Positive results
include:
 South Orange and Maplewood housing values are “increasing at
a proportionately higher rate” than those of surrounding
segregated suburbs; 397
 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data “shows that whites and
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra notes 424-427 and accompanying text for a description of paired testing.
FUND FOR AN OPEN SOC’Y, RACIAL AND ETHNIC INTEGRATION, supra note 380, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
Id.
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people of color are now buying homes in every census tract in
the community”; 398
 Money Magazine named Maplewood “one of the Top Ten
communities in the nation, specifically citing its diversity”;399
and
 Increased representation by people of color in both town
councils. 400
Thus, as in Shaker Heights, coordinated pro-integration efforts have
benefited Maplewood and South Orange. Yet, these types of coordinated
pro-integration measures are, unfortunately, rare. The absence of regionalscale policy approaches in most metropolitan areas impedes pro-integration
efforts.
Recognizing the value and successes of these integration efforts, W.
Dennis Keating nevertheless observes that, for significant progress to be
made, it is necessary to have “metropolitan strategies that would apply to
all suburbs, not just those few that voluntarily have tried to deal with racial
issues in housing.” 401 Because dynamics within cities in a metropolitan
region play out at the regional scale, Keating concludes that “[t]he lack of a
viable metropolitan fair housing strategy or, in the alternative, countywide
incentives for pro-integrative policies has resulted in piecemeal progress at
best.” 402
C. Fostering Stable Racial-Ethnic Diversity
The two case studies (Shaker Heights, Ohio and South Orange and
Maplewood, New Jersey) 403 illustrate the value of proactive, multifaceted
efforts to promote stable integration. Researchers have observed that
communities characterized by “self-conscious diversity” are more stable
than communities that do not actively work to develop and sustain
diversity. 404 For example, Philip Nyden, Michael Maly, and John Lukehart
reached that conclusion after examining the characteristics of fourteen
stable racially and ethnically diverse urban communities. 405 Based on their

398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. KEATING, supra note 371, at 72.
402. Id.
403. See supra Parts V.A and V.B respectively.
404. Philip Nyden et al., The Emergence of Stable Racially and Ethnically Diverse
Communities: A Case Study of Nine U.S. Cities, 8 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 491, 512-13
(1997).
405. Id. at 497.
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research, Nyden, Maly, and Lukehart recommended the following policies
and community-based strategies to encourage and maintain stably
integrated communities:
 Expect government leaders and agencies proactively to promote
diverse neighborhoods. 406
 Encourage consciousness on the part of urban planners “to
examine the consequences of their actions . . . that may either
destabilize existing neighborhoods or thwart the development of
new diverse neighborhoods.” 407
 Maintain and strengthen fair housing laws.408
 Encourage public and private funding and programs that
promote mixed-income, racially diverse communities.409
 Develop and disseminate information on strategies to strengthen
community-based organizations.410
 Establish citywide and regional networks of diverse community
organizations. 411
 Develop “[l]eadership training institutes for residents of diverse
communities.” 412
 Maintain quality schools and community safety programs in
diverse neighborhoods.
 Encourage the creation of programs that support mixed-income
development.
 Encourage local chambers of commerce and other business
associations to view diverse communities “as potentially strong
markets.” 413
 Encourage the media to tell “the positive stories of diverse
community successes.” 414
 Encourage ““[l]ocal community organizations, existing
institutions, and local governments . . . to be receptive to new
groups and be willing to work with them on common
community issues.” 415
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.

Id. at 523.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 524.
Id.
Id. at 525.
Id.
Id.
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Develop programs to create jobs and improve access to jobs in
surrounding communities. 416
 Conduct public discussions about whether “maintaining ethnicand race-based political constituencies undermines efforts to
develop and sustain diverse communities.” 417
Legislation should include provisions supporting positive integration
measures like those that have contributed to maintaining stable racially
integrated communities in places like Shaker Heights, Ohio, and South
Orange and Maplewood, New Jersey. These measures must recognize that
housing patterns and school integration are interrelated and thus require
joint efforts by local government and school officials. Positive integration
measures also can include funding and other support for policies such as
the creation of local committees or agencies dedicated to residential
integration, and the provision of low-interest mortgage loans to
homebuyers in areas where the homebuyers’ race is under-represented.
Government funding as well as private foundation funding should be
tapped to support these initiatives.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Land use and housing policies should be marshaled to reduce residential
racial segregation and concentrated poverty. Two recommendations are
foundational for policy development. The first is to ensure that policies
address an effective geographic scale: policies must apply to a statewide or,
at least, regional area. If adopted only in isolated municipalities or
counties, land-use policies can increase urban sprawl and the resulting
segregation by encouraging leapfrog development. Developers and home
buyers unwilling to abide by land use or housing policies in one place will
take their development elsewhere.418
The second foundational recommendation is to adopt a coordinated
policy approach. Oregon’s comprehensive land use legislation is a solid
starting point for crafting a system of laws to facilitate residential
integration by providing access to affordable housing throughout a metro
region. To that suite of policies can be added inclusionary housing
approaches, effectively sited subsidized housing, and positive integration
measures.
This Article has focused on policies to remedy structural discrimination
that restricts access to affordable housing and to opportunities in vibrant

416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Kushner, supra note 12, at 53.
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and developing portions of metro areas. The first eight recommendations
that follow are strategies for addressing structural discrimination. To
ensure access to opportunity and foster integration, however, we also must
confront overt housing discrimination, which is the focus of the concluding
recommendation.
1. Prohibit Exclusionary Zoning
The logical first step toward providing affordable housing throughout a
region is to eliminate laws and policies that prohibit its development. The
most effective approach is that taken by Oregon to standardize local
governments’ zoning authority by enacting statewide criteria to which all
local zoning provisions must adhere. An aggressive prohibition on
exclusionary zoning should require local planning units to project their
affordable housing needs and to zone in a manner that permits development
of housing types to meet those needs. No jurisdiction should be permitted
blanket prohibitions on attached housing, multifamily housing,
manufactured homes, or government-assisted housing.
A more passive approach, seen in Massachusetts, is to streamline the
permit process for affordable housing developments and to provide state
subsidy programs to promote mixed-income development. If a legislature
chooses a passive approach for discouraging exclusionary zoning, it must
modify the Massachusetts model by distinguishing between family housing
and housing for the elderly. Legislation must provide that all, or at least a
substantial portion, of the new housing created be available to families with
children.
2. Require Comprehensive Planning and Provide for Dedicated
Enforcement
Oregon’s legislation is the best example of a coordinated system of land
use regulation. It manages growth and ensures that localities attend to the
anticipated housing needs of all residents, including those needing
affordable housing. One is the comprehensive planning requirement,
which requires each jurisdiction to predict and provide for the range of
housing needs. The other is the enforcement system, which includes
review entities dedicated to reviewing only land use issues, and prompt
review procedures.
3. Use Urban Growth Boundaries to Reduce Sprawl and Promote
Infill
UGBs that contain sprawl can alleviate the spatial isolation of central
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city residents from jobs and other opportunities in outlying suburbs. UGBs
should be part of a coordinated land use system at a regional scale to avoid
“leapfrogging” and extreme impacts on the land and housing markets. In
addition, policies to facilitate development and ensure adequate housing
supplies should be part of any UGB policy. These include expedited
review of proposed developments that include affordable housing, density
bonuses, higher-density zoning, and periodic review of the supply of land
available for development.
4. Adopt Proactive Policies to Prevent Displacement
Policies like UGBs that promote infill development must be
accompanied by policies to prevent such development from displacing lowincome persons and residents of color. Besides prohibiting exclusionary
zoning, displacement-mitigating strategies should include “fair share”
inclusionary housing policies. These can require any infill development to
include affordable housing units, and can provide for subsidies, such as
housing trust funds, to help finance affordable housing construction.419
5. Link Affordable Housing Development with Public Transportation
If affordable housing is developed at sites where public transit is
available, residents without personal vehicles will have greater access to
employment and other opportunities. James Kushner has proposed the
following transit-related and equity-oriented initiatives that can help guide
policy development:
1. Make the infrastructure investment to create efficient, highspeed inter-city trains and convenient local transit in urban
areas.
2. Increase funding for urban transit and “Transit-oriented
development” (TOD): mixed-use, high-density walkable
pedestrian neighborhoods around stops.
3. Condition transit subsidies on land use conversion to TOD
around stations and stops.
4. Condition transit funding on cities establishing a transit corridor
plan with identified routes implemented through the use of
TODs around stops.
5. Condition transit funding on the establishment of “urban growth
boundaries” that accommodate reasonably anticipated regional
growth.

419. Id. at 68.
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6. Establish incentives for in-fill development. Empowerment and
enterprise zones should be available to encourage TOD
development along transit corridors in lower-income
communities in need of revitalization.
7. Establish a tax credit program offering incentives for urban infill
development.
8. Require inclusion of a minimum percentage of low-income
housing tax-credit financed units and offer reservation priority
for developers of TODs.
9. Establish a housing program generating a mixture of incomes
linked by transportation and employment access, targeting infill
development along transit corridors.
10. Make necessary modifications to the federal Community
Development Block Grant Program to authorize the use of block
grant funds for development of TODs in low-income
communities.
11. Condition federal highway and transit funding on the states’
requiring a transit corridor plan element in local comprehensive
plans that designate TOD development at transit stops.
12. Modify state redevelopment laws to allow their use as an
alternative to traditional blight determination in executing infill
TOD plans, albeit with stringent restrictions favoring
rehabilitation and reuse over clearance or demolition.
13. Eliminate sprawl-generating subsidies such as funds for
suburban highway and road construction or the provision of
subsidized water, or sewer facilities and service, on the urban
fringe. Structure compensating subsidies that favor urban infill
and TOD development.
14. Plan for the use of parks and green space throughout the
community to make attractive pedestrian corridors.
15. Establish regional government authority to plan transit and
corridor development rather than allowing traditional local
autonomy.
16. Establish a regional tax-sharing scheme that will encourage
affordable housing inclusion and discourage destructive sales
tax competition. 420

420. Id. at 58-60.
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6. Adopt Inclusionary Housing Policies
Policies that encourage or, better yet, require each jurisdiction to provide
its “fair share” of affordable housing can help reduced segregation and
concentrated poverty if designed to include sufficient low-income housing
and to ensure a race-conscious fair share for non-White residents.
Subsidies can assist production of very low-income units. Lotteries and
assignment of a substantial share of the units to public housing authorities
can help ensure that people of color have access to these housing
opportunities.
To be effective, inclusionary housing policies should apply to
developments as small as ten units, or there should be provisions for
developers to “buy-out” the requirement, with the funds going to support
low-income housing development. If most units are maintained as rentals,
and if the units are not permitted to revert to market rates after a short
period, these policies should better serve poor and non-White residents
within a metro region.
7. Promote Positive Integration Measures
Legislation should include provisions supporting positive integration
measures like those that have contributed to maintaining stable racially
integrated communities in places like Shaker Heights, Ohio, and South
Orange and Maplewood, New Jersey. Among the important features of
these measures is recognition that housing patterns and school integration
are interrelated, leading to joint efforts by local government and school
officials to work together to preserve and create diverse communities.
Positive integration measures also can include funding and other support
for policies such as the creation of local committees or agencies dedicated
to residential integration, and the provision of low-interest mortgage loans
to purchasers of homes in areas where their race is under-represented.
Government funding as well as private foundation funding should be
tapped to support these initiatives.
Based on their empirical research of stable diverse communities, Nyden,
Maly, and Lukehart recommended a suite of policies and community-based
strategies to encourage and maintain stably integrated communities.421
These pro-integration measures can be added to the other approaches that
this article recommends.

421. See supra notes 406-417 and accompanying text (describing the various policies that
the authors recommend).
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8. Effectively Site Subsidized Housing
Strategies for siting subsidized housing should disperse units throughout
a metro region rather than concentrate them. In most regions, that means
increasing the number and proportion of units available in suburban
locations, especially newer, fast-growing suburbs. Any policies should
provide that housing developed under the Low Income Housing Tax
Credit 422 be dispersed throughout a metro region and not be sited either in
areas of concentrated poverty or areas that are racially segregated or
resegregating.
9. Enforce and Strengthen Laws Prohibiting Discrimination in
Housing Markets
Unlike the preceding recommendations, this one addresses overt
discrimination. While not the topic of this article, overt discrimination in
housing remains a barrier to accessing opportunity. While it may be
lessening, discrimination against Black and Hispanic renters and
homebuyers persists in major metropolitan areas.423 Thus, rigorous
enforcement of existing federal, state, and local laws prohibiting
discrimination in the housing market is essential, and these laws must be
strengthened where necessary.
One can use paired testing to detect discrimination in the housing
market. 424 Paired testing “control[s] for differences between white and
minority homeseekers, and directly measure[s] patterns of adverse
treatment based on a homeseeker’s race or ethnicity.”425 Pairs of testers—
one White and one Black or Hispanic—are provided with identical
credentials and trained to present themselves to real estate agents or
landlords, posing as potential renters or homebuyers.426 Although the
mortgage lending process is more complex, making paired testing more
difficult, a recent HUD publication reports that paired testing also can be an
effective tool for research and enforcement of anti-discrimination laws in
mortgage lending. 427 To reduce overt discrimination, state and local

422. 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2005); see also Orfield, Racial Segregation and Community
Revitalization, supra note 163.
423. TURNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 8-1 to 8-5; YINGER, CLOSED DOORS,
OPPORTUNITIES LOST, supra note 14, at 49.
424. TURNER ET AL., supra note 14, at i.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., ALL
OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL: A PAIRED TESTING STUDY OF MORTGAGE LENDING
INSTITUTIONS ii (2002), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/PDF/aotbe.pdf.
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governments must be pushed to fund ongoing paired testing, either by
government agencies or by nonprofit fair housing organizations.
CONCLUSION
Existing examples of housing and land use policies that promote a
racially and economically integrated society are valuable. While imperfect,
they are heartening and instructive illustrations. By adopting and refining
the best of the policies and practices already in use, the harmful effects of
sprawl and concentrated poverty on non-White and poor residents can be
reduced.
The racial segregation and concentrated poverty resulting from structural
barriers such as sprawl and exclusionary zoning operate to isolate nonWhite and poor residents far from places of opportunity. Each day they
engrave inequality into the landscapes of our metropolitan regions. In
response, communities can promote development that removes barriers to
opportunity by making affordable housing available throughout a
metropolitan region. One way to ensure that access to opportunity is
available in a metropolitan region, irrespective of race or ethnicity, is to
adopt proactive housing and land use policies.

